U.S. Diplomacy

We all remember these famous words from President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address:

“States like these [Iran, North Korea and Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” 

But here are excerpts from two other State of the Union addresses given by President George W. Bush. Can you tell which one was given in 2006 and in 2008? 

Excerpt One: 

“[Iran is] a nation now held hostage by a small clerical elite that is isolating and repressing its people. The regime in that country sponsors terrorists in the Palestinian territories and in Lebanon — and that must come to an end. The Iranian government is defying the world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons. America will continue to rally the world to confront these threats.

Tonight, let me speak directly to the citizens of Iran: America respects you, and we respect your country. We respect your right to choose your own future and win your own freedom. And our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran.”  

Excerpt Two:

“We’re also standing against the forces of extremism embodied by the regime in Tehran. Iran’s rulers oppress a good and talented people. And wherever freedom advances in the Middle East, it seems the Iranian regime is there to oppose it. Iran is funding and training militia groups in Iraq, supporting Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon, and backing Hamas’ efforts to undermine peace in the Holy Land. Tehran is also developing ballistic missiles of increasing range, and continues to develop its capability to enrich uranium, which could be used to create a nuclear weapon.  

Our message to the people of Iran is clear: We have no quarrel with you. We respect your traditions and your history. We look forward to the day when you have your freedom. Our message to the leaders of Iranis also clear: Verifiably suspend your nuclear enrichment, so negotiations can begin. And to rejoin the community of nations, come clean about your nuclear intentions and past actions, stop your oppression at home, cease your support for terror abroad. But above all, know this: America will confront those who threaten our troops. We will stand by our allies, and we will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf.” 

If you guessed that the first excerpt was part of the 2006 SOU address, and the second was part of the 2008, congratulations you are correct! 

Whether or not you think Bush’s speech writers have run out of ideas, one thing is for certain: The Iranian government didn’t like Bush’s message to Iran any better the second time around.

From the Associated Press: “Iran’s Foreign Ministry on Tuesday called U.S. President George W. Bush’s accusations against Iran in his State of the Union address as redundant and insignificant, state television here reported.The TV quoted ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini as saying the American leader’s annual speech offered “repeated and stereotype (statements) … which lacked any new point and issue.”  The government spokesman had his own message for the US government:  “We advise the U.S. president to put the real concerns of American people on his agenda: economic recession, violations of human values and the severe psychological crisis of the its military people, dismayed over occupation of Iraq,” Hosseini said. 

[Side note: Because the US and Iran cut diplomatic ties between the two after the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the US-Iranian public conversation is relegated to more symbolic modes of communication. On the same day as the President’s address the US Ambassador to the UN struck the wrong chord with the Bush administration for his choice of seat next to the Iranian foreign minister at the World Economic Forum meetings in Davos, Switzerland.]   Yet the point is not that the President’s speech writers, in their seven long years of wordsmithing, have run out of ideas. Rather, comparing the two addresses reveals that not much has changed in terms of Iranian-US relations over the past two years. And considering how tensions have grown between the two nations, perhaps that’s not such a bad thing. 

The 2008 address does distinguish itself from the 2006 by a growth in and refinement of the list of grievances the President gives for the Iranian regime: Oppression of the Iranian people, funding and training militia groups in Iraq, supporting Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon, backing Hamas’ efforts to undermine peace in the Holy Land, developing ballistic missiles of increasing range, as well as its increasing capability to enrich uranium, which could be used to create a nuclear weapon. 

However there has been a major change between 2006 and 2008 in regards to the nuclear grievances. In December of 2007 US intelligence services published a National Intelligence Estimate detailing Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The report found, contrary to the administration’s accusations, that Iran stopped working on a suspected nuclear weapons program more than four years ago.  The NIE had the effect of soothing escalating tensions between the two nations in the short term, but Bush’s determination to halt Iran’s uranium enrichment program has not been deterred.  Michele Keleman of NPR offers an analysis of President Bush’s rationale for repeating a strong warning against Iran’s nuclear intentions:  

“U.S. diplomats are in the midst of negotiations on a U.N. sanctions resolution aimed at building up pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions. News that the U.S. intelligence community believes that Iran halted a nuclear weapons program in 2003 has made the sanctions debate more complicated, according to diplomats involved. So the president has been repeating, often, all of his concerns about Iran’s behavior, to remind U.S. partners why they need to act.”

IPS’s reporting offers a reason why Bush’s remarks on US foreign policy in general sound so familiar: “With just less than one year left in his presidency, George W. Bush remains as focused as ever on the Middle East and Iraq and appears reluctant to take on any major new foreign policy challenges in the time that he remains in power.” 

Out of the hour-long address Bush’s remarks aimed at Iran were not the most widely-reported by the US media. Aside from the Iranian press’ publication of Tehran’s reaction, one Israeli online news outlet thought Bush’s message for Iran deserved a headline, pointing out that Bush said he would be willing to “confront those who threaten our troops” and defend its allies and interests in the Gulf.

One final note: The Council on Foreign Relations made available a video of a meeting on “U.S.-Iran Relations: Past, Present, and Future” The distinguished panelists (Trita Parsi and Barbara Slavin) discuss relations between the United States and Iran, including Iran’s role in Iraq, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, and prospects for an improved U.S.-Iran relationship in the future. 

Download link 

Monday’s State of the Union Address was heavy on the economy and ideological posturing. However, foreign policy issues were addressed, and this blog would like to touch upon what was said.

Stepping back and taking a macro-viewpoint of the speech, Bush did not provide new policy initiatives, which we had wondered about on this blog with regards to North Korea. The President reviewed his administration’s goal of advancing freedom, and he cited elections in Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia and Ukraine as well as “demanding independence” in Lebanon. Notably left out was Palestine. While the administration may not have been pleased with the outcome, strong support was pushed onto the Palestinians for having a free and fair election. They did so, but the outcome of Hamas leading the Palestinian Authority soured the administration, thus it should be of no surprise that the administration does not include that election as a success in the advancement of liberty.

Let us now dive into the minutia of his speech.

Iraq

Bush noted our surge and went on to describe the Sunni Awakening as the Iraqi surge. “In the fall of 2006, Sunni tribal leaders grew tired of al Qaeda’s brutality and started a popular uprising called ‘The Anbar Awakening.’ Over the past year, similar movements have spread across the country. And today, the grassroots surge includes more than 80,000 Iraqi citizens who are fighting the terrorists.”

While successes can be drawn on the security front, political reconciliation remains a lofty goal. As an example of progress in reconciliation, President Bush mentioned the recently passed de-Ba’athification law. However, most analysts are unsure whether the law will truly serve its intended purpose. Looking at political reconciliation on the whole, the Center for American Progress concludes we have reached only 3 of the 18 benchmarks.

Israeli-Palestinian relations

President Bush reaffirmed his position that Palestine will have a state by the end of this year: “This month in Ramallah and Jerusalem, I assured leaders from both sides that America will do, and I will do, everything we can to help them achieve a peace agreement that defines a Palestinian state by the end of this year.”

As we have discussed on this blog before, President Bush’s influence can make the most difference on final-status issues. Optimism is crucial when dealing with tough negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, and Bush should remain engaged on this front.

The Americas

Bush urged Congress to approve trade agreements for Columbia and Panama (in addition to South Korea). He noted that failure to pass the bill in Columbia would “embolden the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere.” A clear shot at Hugo Chavez.

Afghanistan

Bush spoke of the 3,200 Marines sent to Afghanistan, in order to provide training for their police and army, along with fighting the Taliban. The U.S. Defense blog first mentioned this increase.

For the sake of keeping this post somewhat concise my partner will tackle Iran.

Over at the Election 2008 blog, Mark Dillen discusses Madeleine Albright’s book “Memo to the Next President Elect: How We Can Restore America’s Reputation and Leadership.” His post also contains a good soundbite from Albright in which she clarifies a common misunderstanding about diplomatic efforts: “Diplomacy is not appeasement. You can deliver tough messages as well as nice messages, but there has to be a dialogue.”

Earlier this month, Albright opined that America has “developed a dangerous lack of self-awareness.” She continues, “we need to do a better job of seeing ourselves as others do… true confidence is shown by a willingness to enter into difficult debates, answer criticism, treat others with respect and do our share or more in tackling global problems. Confidence harnessed to purpose is what America at its best has been all about.”

Her statement about America’s lack of self-awareness reminds one of Sun Tzu’s warning, “know thy enemy but not thyself, wallow in defeat everytime.” Indeed, it would serve the United States well to heed both Albright and Sun Tzu’s advice.

A 2006 assessment of the State Department’s Public Diplomacy (PD) program conducted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB, a Cabinet-level office run out the White House) ranks the program’s overall performance “adequate,” (as opposed to “effective, moderately effective, or ineffective”). The more abbreviated “assessment summary” can be found here.

The State Department describes the key functions of Public Diplomacy and its foreign officers as “indispensable” to the conduct of foreign policy. Accordingly, PD’s key activities, as outlined in the assessment’s “program performance measures,” amount to no small feat for PD officers.

According to the assessment, the program’s main goal is generating an “audience with an improved or increased understanding of U.S. policies, society and values.” Some of the ‘softer’ goals listed in the assessment include reaching key foreign audiences through State Department-sponsored exchange programs and increasing the user satisfaction scores of the US Embassy Web sites.

The more public relations-type functions (to give a less cynical depiction) include generating “accurate/favorable portrayals” of U.S. policies in key foreign media outlets and engineering editorial and opinion commentary support by foreign audiences for U.S. policies and positions.

Then there’s the granddaddy of them all: reducing the level of anti-American sentiment among key foreign audiences. This goal is commonly referred to as “winning hearts and minds,” a campaign the US first launched during the Vietnam war, and now commonly refers to US efforts at improving relations with the “Muslim” world. Given the rise in anti-American sentiment across the Middle East and beyond, this particular performance measurement may drag down PD’s overall ranking for a good time to come.

With such far-reaching and invasive goals set out, it is no wonder PD’s lowest-scoring is the “Program Results” assessment section: “Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals? Answer: No” (the assessment sites as evidence polling from Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew’s 2007 polling on global views of the US is shown below).

Relative to other US government programs assessed by OMB, PD’s “adequate” ranking puts it on the lower end of the performance spectrum. The State Department as a whole performs about as well as other government agencies (27 “effective” programs, 12 “moderately effective,” 13 “adequate,” 0 “inadequate”), such as Defense, (19, 19, 10, 0), Homeland Security (9, 18, 6, 0). Based on OMB’s most recent assessments, 22% of Federal programs are “not performing,” or are considered ineffective. To view an explanation of the ranking criteria, click here.

Though the ExpectMore.gov site has been criticized for the “shallowness of its content,” the 2006 assessment does a good job of conveying exactly what State’s PD program attempts to achieve (or, as the case may be, not achieve).

Three cheers for transparency… But by tasking this relatively small bureau with challenging goals such as “changing the hearts and minds” of vast, increasingly antagonistic foreign audiences—especially without necessarily pairing that goal with the implementation of effective and agreeable foreign policies—we will continue to “ExpectMore” out of State’s PD program.

Soft balancing against the United States is on the rise and the next President will face a myriad of challenges in asserting American influence, so argues Parag Khanna. His article in the New York Time Magazine this week encapsulates a vast swath of recent history and developments in geopolitics, particularly across the second world.

In the future he sees a security and soft power competition among three major powers, the United States, China, and the European Union. His prescription for the coming battle over influence, create a diplomatic industrial complex.

“Pentagonize the State Department…Diplomacy, too, requires the equivalent of geographic commands — with top-notch assistant secretaries of state to manage relations in each key region without worrying about getting on the daily agenda of the secretary of state for menial approvals. Then we’ll be ready to coordinate within distant areas.”

“Regional institutions are thriving in the second world — think Mercosur(the South American common market), the Association of Southeast Asian Naitons (Asean), the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Persian Gulf. We need high-level ambassadors at those organizations too.”

“Condoleezza Rice’s ‘transformational diplomacy’ is a myth: we don’t have enough diplomats for core assignments, let alone solo hardship missions. We need a Peace Corps 10 times its present size, plus student exchanges, English-teaching programs and hands-on job training overseas — with corporate sponsorship.”

In tackling public diplomacy, Khanna unleashes his “secret weapon,” the American citizenry. “American foundations and charities, not least the Gates and Ford Foundations, dwarf European counterparts in their humanitarian giving; if such private groups independently send more and more American volunteers armed with cash, good will and local knowledge to perform ‘diplomacy of the deed,’ then the public diplomacy will take care of itself.”

While his plan is fresh and bold, it ignores the current state of affairs among the diplomatic corps. As my fellow blogger eloquently pointed out the State Department is facing cuts across the board, the opposite direction Khanna suggests we should be headed. That said, the ills at the State Department can be remedied by assurances from the next President. Until State receives word of the next President’s priorities, I would advise a degree of caution in Khanna’s comparison to that of the military-industrial complex. It did not happen overnight; likewise it would truly be a diplomatic revolution were it to be realized in the coming decade(s).

Go check out his thought-provoking article and anyone interested might want to purchase his forthcoming book, due out in March.

US President George W. Bush famously characterized a nation’s position on the war on terror either “with us or against us.” But happens when those who are “with us” are not necessarily “against” those who are “against us?” Such is the case in Pakistan, where with the help of some polling and John Stewart, we see that the Pakistan-US relationship is a bit more complex.

The US-Pakistan Relationship

Although the American and Pakistani governments have shared tight alliances in the past, the Bush administration and Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharraf have developed a particularly close relationship throughout the past 7 years. The relationship centers around Musharraf’s pledge to be “with us” in the war on terror, that is, to hunt down US arch enemy Osama bin Laden and other Islamic extremists reported to be operating out of Pakistan.

The US has recognized these efforts, formally so in 2002 when the House passed a concurrent resolution “Commending President Pervez Musharraf Of Pakistan For His Leadership And Friendship And Welcoming Him To The United States” (full text here). Musharraf’s counter-terrorism efforts have been amply funded by the US, having received more than $10 billion in mostly military aid since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

While the General’s efforts were initially praised, more recently his commitment to fighting terrorism has been questioned, especially his effectiveness in combating a resurgence of Al Qaeda and Taliban extremists along the Pakistan-Afghan border. In January of last year the House passed (see section 2042) an appropriations bill that called for greater accountability for aid to Pakistan, though it failed to pass the Senate.

Meanwhile, Musharraf instists that he is committed to fighting terrorism within Pakistan not for the sake of the US-Pakistan alliance, but rather for the sake of his own nation’s national security.

He’s so committed to rooting out Islamic extremists, the AP reported two days ago, that he has made that his number one priority—not so much finding bin Laden, as the US wishes.

Enter Public Opinion

Whether or not you believe General Musharraf is sincere in his efforts to hunt down bin Laden, a recent poll shows the Pakistani public doesn’t seem all too concerned about the hunt for bin Laden, and anyway thinks the US poses a bigger threat to Pakistan’s national security.

Veteran Inter Press Service Washington correspondent Jim Lobe reports:“Amid reports that the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush is considering aggressive covert actions against armed Islamist forces in western Pakistan, a new survey released here Monday suggested that such an effort would be opposed by an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis themselves.

The survey, which was funded by the quasi-governmental U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and designed by the University of Maryland’s Programme on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), also found that a strong majority of Pakistanis consider the U.S. military presence in Asia and neighbouring Afghanistan a much more critical threat to their country than al Qaeda or Pakistan’s own Taliban movement in the tribal regions along the border with Afghanistan.”

The poll also shows that most urban Pakistanis do not necessarily believe Bin Laden is currently operating in Pakistan, and even so they have mixed views of the Al Qaeda leader:

“Q25. For each of the following people, would you say your feelings are very positive, somewhat positive, mixed, somewhat negative, or very negative? a. Osama bin Laden

Very positive………………………………………………………………………13%

Somewhat positive……………………………………………………………….18 Mixed…………………………………………………………………………………19

Somewhat negative………………………………………………………………..8

Very negative………………………………………………………………………..8

Refused/Don’t know…………………………………………………………….35”

In short, the Pakistani public has what their government considers “ally” and “enemy” reversed.

Enter John Stewart

Pop culture provides us a further example of how the “with us or against us” approach to the war on terror does not accurately fit the complexities of the modern US-Pakistan relationship. In September of 2006 General Musharraf appeared on Jon Stewart’s popular satirical news show in the United States—in fact the first foreign President ever to do so. Stewart popped the question of whether President George W. Bush or Osama bin Laden would win the popular vote in a presidential election in Pakistan. Musharraf chuckled “I think they’ll both lose miserably.”

At least we know that Al Qaeda doesn’t see Musharraf as “with them” in their war against the US.

Progress

Despite the US President’s unfailing support for Musharraf as an ally in the war on terror, US lawmakers are becoming more critical, no doubt thanks to several compelling testimonies (notably Lawrence Korb and Ashley Tellis) before Congressional committees of late.

“It has become all too clear that U.S. policies and assistance toward Pakistan since Sept. 11 — while not without some successes — have failed to neutralize anti-Western militants or reduce religious extremism,” said Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who chaired a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on aid to Pakistan this month.

Last week the Agence France Presse reported that Representative Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, “said that the reliance by President George W. Bush’s administration on “war on terror” ally Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to restore democracy while fighting against extremism had not worked.“

The IHT reports that in a recent hearing Ackerman urged [US Deputy Secretary of State] Negroponte to “get some phone numbers of some other generals.”

Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the few to identify the public as one layer of Pakistani society that the US should be seeking to ally: “The United States must shift from the “transactional” approach of “aid for services to a normal, functioning relationship… The United States should seek a “relationship based on the Pakistani government and its people, not just Musharraf,” Biden said.

Who’s “With” Who?

Now Bush’s mantra has come full circle: US lawmakers are beginning to turn “against” those who are supposed to be “with us” in the war on terror. This evolution in the US-Pakistan relationship over the past seven years shows that neither the US nor Pakistan—their leaders nor their publics—fit squarely into the “with us or against us” approach to the war on terror.

Jay Lefkowitz, the US Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, spoke at AEI last week of a renewed debate within the administration over its restrained diplomacy track with North Korea. Indeed, he offered three concrete steps for future engagement:

“1. We should now shift our focus from a short to a longer time frame. It is increasingly likely that North Korea will have the same nuclear status one year from now that it has today.

2. Policy should rest on assumptions that correlate with recent facts and events. It is evident that South Korea and China will not exert significant pressure on North Korea if they think it might lead to its collapse.

3. All negotiations with North Korea should firmly link human rights, economic support, and security issues.”

State Dept. spokesman Sean McCormack was quick to distance the administration from Lefkowitz’s comments. “He [Lefkowitz] is not, however, somebody who speaks authoritatively about the six-party talks. His comments certainly don’t represent the views of the administration.” However, North Korea policy likely falls along the usual fault lines within the Administration. The Vice President’s office arguing for a tougher stance, whereas the State Department maintains diplomatic tenets, working with the most recent agreement made during six-party talks.

Another possibility is at play here, and seems to be consistent with our policy and rhetoric towards Iran. Sending out ripples of a tougher stance towards North Korea might be a useful diplomatic tool. Articulating stronger costs for not acting, could push North Korea to meet future deadlines, which they have already shown a penchant to delay or miss.

Perhaps sensing the debate brewing at the White House, John Bolton penned an op-ed arguing for the United States to abandon the agreement reached last year. Bolton has long held animosity towards any deal with North Korea lacking tough measures for failure to comply.

Bolton sees a window of opportunity for President Bush. “Given the recent South Korean presidential election results, Mr. Bush will soon have a willing ally in Lee Myung-bak, who will be inaugurated on Feb. 25. After 10 years, a realist will once again occupy Seoul’s Blue House, one who will support a tougher American line rather than oppose it.”

As Timothy Savage of North Korea zone notes, a shift in the diplomatic track with North Korea could be announced during the upcoming state of the union address. We will certainly be listening here and report back any significant changes, if they’re mentioned.

On Friday the State Department announced that Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, will be retiring from the number 3 post in the Department. Burns said he was leaving because it is “time for me to meet my obligations to my wife and three daughters, and it’s time to pursue other ventures outside the government.”

Click below to watch Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s farewell remarks.

Burns’ departure also brought kind words from President Bush and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Tom Lantos (also scheduled to retire at the end of his term). After 27 years of service, Burns is the highest ranking career diplomat in the foreign service.

The State Department announced Burns’ replacement–William Burns Ambassador to Russia up until today when the President recalled him from the Moscow embassy (Nicholas and William are of no relation).

An editorial in the Middle East Times calls Burns’ departure a “big loss” for the Bush administration, “coming at a time when the president hopes to shift the Middle East peace talks into high gear…

“Burns’ departure will deprive the administration of an experienced diplomat, one who understood the Middle East better than his bosses. In fact, Burns, who speaks Arabic, began his career in North Africa and the Middle East, first as an intern at the U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, then vice consul and staff assistant to the ambassador in Cairo, (1983-1985), and then political officer at the American Consulate General in Jerusalem from 1985 to 1987. In this position, he coordinated U.S. economic assistance to the Palestinian population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem…”

The editorial continues: “…In selecting William Burns to replace Nicolas Burns, Bush and his secretary of State demonstrated the president’s commitment in trying to extract a peaceful solution in the Middle East before he leaves office exactly a year from this Monday.”

While some are hopeful about William’s appointment for the prospects of peace in the Middle East, others are weary that Nicholas’ departure will short circuit on ongoing nuclear negotiations with India. The Associated Press reports in an article titled “Diplomat’s Departure Muddles Nuke Deal:”

“…The departure of the State Department’s No. 3 official adds uncertainty to a U.S. nuclear deal with India that is already in deep trouble.

…The deal would allow the United States to send nuclear fuel and technology to India, which has been cut off from international atomic markets because of its refusal to sign nonproliferation accords or accept their inspection regimes and its testing of nuclear weapons.

Although most major opposition in Congress has been countered, the deal still faces tough questions in India. The government has set up a committee to examine the pact, which Indian critics say could cap the country’s nuclear weapons program and would allow the United States to dictate Indian foreign policy…”

Yet the Times of India reports that President Bush expects Nicholas Burns will “continue to serve in an advisory capacity as the United States continues to make progress on the historic civilian nuclear agreement with India.”

Burns will be no slouch up until he leaves his post in March. The Agence France Presse reports that Burns will accompany Secretary Rice for key talks next week with her counterparts from Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany in Berlin to discuss the new sanctions on Iran.

Here’s the bad news. The Washington Post reports that the State Department will be cutting 10 percent of diplomatic posts next year.

Veteran diplomatic correspondent Karen DeYoung reports:   “Nearly one-quarter of all diplomatic posts are vacant after hundreds of Foreign Service officers were sent to embassies in Baghdad and Kabul, and Congress has not provided funding for new hires… The size of the foreign service, about 6,500 diplomats, increased by approximately 300 positions a year between 2001 and 2004, but since then Congress has rejected requests for additional hiring for all but consular and security positions.” 

This is bad news on many levels:  

–First the cuts make painfully apparent the reality that the State Department is starved of resources. At a time when global opinion of theUnited States is at an all time low, the overseas presence of our diplomatic corps is shrinking. The cuts seem especially drastic when one considers that throughout its history the State Department, relative to its mandate, has been chronically under funded.

A rigorous 2003 Task Force report published by an umbrella organization of US diplomatic groups recommends that Congress appropriate a full 30% increase in the State Department budget. That’s not a plea for more office supplies. It reminds me of Oliver Twist’s weary cry “please sir may I have some more…”  

Let’s think about how the effects of these budget cuts might play out. Next year the US Foreign Service will be 10 percent less able to negotiate hot-button issues with other leaders, report on developments from afar, promote US values to unfamiliar audiences, maintain constructive relationships with our allies, monitor and respond to the actions of our enemies, and protect our embassies and traveling countrymen, among many other essential activities. It’s a difficult picture to paint because the State Department’s activities are embedded in so many foreign interactions essential to our domestic livelihood.   

–But more importantly the budget cuts reflect a continuing emphasis on military capabilities rather than diplomatic capabilities in US federal budgeting priorities. In 2007 the defense budget totaled $439.3 billion for regular department spending, not including money for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 2008 its budget will increase 44 billion to $483 billion. Ironically enough that’s a 9% increase in the Defense Department budget…  

Defense’s bountiful budget allows it to even take on some activities traditionally left to State. The State Department’s office of Public Diplomacy attempts to win the “battle of ideas” by improving the US’ image abroad. That office enjoys an annual budget of $900 million. On the other side of the river, Secretary Gates last year created a new position called the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy, to spearhead the military’s strategic communications and run their “countering ideological support to terrorism” program.

According to the US National Defense Strategy, part of this program entails: “helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West; and reinforcing the message that the Global War on Terrorism is not a war against Islam, but rather is an outgrowth of a civil war within Islam between extremists and those who oppose them.” 

 The State Department has a large Public Diplomacy bureau that handles those very tasks, along with strategic communications in general. Of course we are all better off for having the largest number of and most effective strategists assigned to this daunting and vital task. Still, “Defense department” and “soft power” don’t logically go hand in hand. Furthermore, it would be understandable that a global public weary of American unilateralism might not trust the “spin” coming out of the military establishment. 

In short, when diplomatic activities start being transferred to the military branch, everyone suffers—not just the starving State Department.

On Tuesday, an American Embassy vehicle was the target of a bombing in Beirut. The explosion left two US Embassy officials with light injures. An American citizen, not affiliated with the US Embassy, was also injured. At least three people died and more than twenty were wounded.

The attack was the first on American interests since 1991, leading analysts to raise questions about a renewed threat for Americans traveling or living in Lebanon.

A sociology professor at Lebanese University, Talal Atrissi, has a cynical outlook: “We have entered a new phase of targets, everything is now possible. It is a threat to spread chaos if no solutions are reached.”

On the other hand, political science professor Shafik Masri did not suggest this attack was part of a “new track,” but that it was a continuation of attacks in recent months.

Not getting coverage in American media, but of note was the denunciation provided by Hezbollah’s spiritual leader Hassan Nasrallah:

“We condemn and denounce any explosion that takes place on Lebanese territory, regardless of who is targeted, and especially if innocent people are killed.” However, take that comment with a grain of salt. In 1983 Hezbollah killed a total of 241 Marines, Navy Personnel and Army Soldiers in the bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut.

Whether this attack is part of a new phase or a continuation, the bottom-line is that Lebanon remains a volatile state. The power struggle between the Shia community and the Christian Maronites is not fading, leaving the government in disarray. In addition, Syrian interests in the country aim to stoke fire whenever a relative calm appears to set in.