If you are a member of Senator McCain or Senator Obama's cadre of campaign advisers, a former US Ambassador, or even a mere foreign policy expert, you are one busy guy/gal right now. Washington is brimming with events with titles like "US Foreign Policy in the Next Presidential Administration: What Will Go Down?" or "President McCain/Obama: What's the Foreign Policy Plan, Stan?"

Here's a list of a few examples:

Last week the Partnership for a Secure America, a Washington-based campaign dedicated to "recreating the bipartisan center in American national security and foreign policy" brought together some distinguished foreign policy practitioners/campaign adviser for an event titled “A Bipartisan Foreign Policy for January 2009.”

Former Ambassador Tom Pickering, for Regan adviser Bud Mcfarlane, and CSIS fellow Rick Barton came together to opine about the kinds of foreign policies the next president could enact with support from both sides of the aisle.

To watch all of the sections of the event, click here. Ambassador Pickering's remarks, in which he enumerated the many foreign policy problems the next President will have to face, can be viewed below.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a center/left-leaning think tank in Washington, has launched an initiative dedicated to this issue, titled "Foreign Policy for the Next President." The initiative includes a series of policy briefs and events that bringing out the usual suspects‚ presidential campaign advisers, former Ambassadors and the like.

To view an excellent event Carnegie hosted debating Senator MacCain's dream of establishing a "League of Democracies" under his presidential watch, click here.

The Cato Institute, a libertarian think thank based in Washington, hosted a discussion of a new book on America can exercise its "Smart Power" in the next administration. One of the discussions I enjoyed attending was hosted by American University, WAMU (NPR's Washington affiliate) and American Public Media back in April. It gathered a Clinton, Omaba and McCain adviser to speak about how the next President can improve the US' image abroad.

Coming up on Monday, the Center for American Progress, a left-leaning think tank in Washington, will be hosting "McCain University." This event discusses all aspects of the Senator's campaign platform, with an afternoon session investigating his foreign policy ideas.

The US Global Leadership Campaign, a "broad based, nationwide coalition of businesses, NGOs, and community leaders that advocates for a strong U.S. International Affairs Budget," will host an event focusing on foreign policy and the next Presidential administration in Washington in July. These are just a sampling of events I have come across. No doubt this issue is being discussed outside the beltway by a variety of different stakeholders. If you come across any events that you think we would be interested in learning about, please post them in the comments section.

Lastly, I thought I would point out a great online resource aimed at generating a global discussion about the foreign policies that can be implemented "On Day One" of the next presidential administration. The the On Day One campaign was launched by the Better World Fund, a campaign to strengthen US-UN relations.

(Secretary Rice at a press conference in June in Lebanon, courtesy of the State Department)

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations’ International Affairs Fellows Conference last week. An edited video of her remarks can be viewed here.

The thrust of Rice's speech centered on the “elements of continuity” thatthe Bush administration's foreign policy has with that of past administrations. Her first example is maintenance of the US alliance with “big powers” Russia and China:

“For instance, coming in, I think everybody understood that it would be important to have workable relationships with the great powers, the big powers in international politics — China, Russia, the newly emerging powers like India and South Africa and Brazil. Important not just because one wants to have fruitful and constructive relations with important powers, but fruitful and constructive relations that can be put to use in carrying out the work of diplomacy and, therefore, solving international problems.

It goes without saying that it is not really feasible to solve many of the problems of international politics through diplomacy if you cannot find at least common interest and common cause with countries like China and Russia, even if you are not doing so from the basis of common values. And having constructive relations with those two giant powers, both members of the Security Council, has been an important part of what we’ve tried to do.

They are, of course, somewhat different. I think that in many ways managing the relationship with Russia has been one of finding common cause on many, many issues while recognizing that in a complex relationship there are going to be many differences and doing so, frankly, in an atmosphere in which perhaps there has been some disappointment that we have not been able to move closer to the common values with Russia that one would have thought possible in 2000.

In fact, it is the internal development of Russia away from a more democratic course that has been, in some ways, the hardest part of managing the relationship. Nonetheless, we have been able to do important things together in nuclear nonproliferation, in working together on Iran and working together on North Korea, in working together on the Middle East in ways that, I think, would have been unthinkable at the time of the Soviet Union.

And so one of the most important things to remind ourselves of almost every day is that however complex the relationship may be with Russia, however difficult sometimes, however difficult Moscow can make it with rhetoric that is, shall I say, outside, it is nonetheless a relationship that is quite unalike our relationship with the Soviet Union. Russia is not the Soviet Union. And reminding ourselves that the scope for cooperation with Russia is far wider and far greater than anything that we ever experienced with the Soviet Union is important to having a solid relationship with Russia going forward. This is embodied in a strategic framework agreement that Presidents Bush and Putin signed at Sochi, which I think shows the breadth of our relationship with Russia…”

The second element of foreign policy continuity Rice mentions is the strengthening of US  alliances. She names the US’ alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia before focusing on NATO, an alliance that she says has been “truly transformed.”

Noting that most Cold War scholars wondered whether NATO would find a purpose for itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rice says that now:

“The remarkable thing is not only is NATO alive, but it is a fundamentally transformed organization for a couple of reasons. First and foremost, because now 12 of the 26+2, the 28 — soon-to-be 28 members of NATO, 12 of them are former captive nations. And they come to the Alliance with a zeal and a love for democracy that can only be the case if you are still very close to your experience with tyranny. And they have changed the nature of the Alliance. And they’ve changed its agenda. And they’ve kept at the forefront the values of the Alliance.

The Alliance is also different because it is taking on new challenges, most extraordinarily well out of area, as we used to talk about, as it takes on the efforts in Afghanistan, as it helps with planning in Darfur, as it helps with training of Iraqi officers and as it builds global relationships with countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea. NATO is a very-much-changed organization.

It's had its ups and downs. I know that there's been a lot of discussion about how it's doing in Afghanistan. I think it's remarkable that it's in Afghanistan. And of course, as it has been developing its capabilities, it is getting better at fighting the tough counterinsurgency fights that we see in these parts of the world, fights that blur the lines between war and peace where very often you’re clearing an area and bringing in economic reconstruction at the same time. This is hard work. It's different than what we’ve done before. And so perhaps it's not surprising that NATO has had to adjust to this.

It is also an alliance that has suffered from the fact that many European armies, European militaries took the peace dividend very deeply and, as a result, cut their defense budgets, cut their capability. And NATO is now trying to rebuild some of that capability….”

What came as a surprise to Rice as she tried to maintain the foreign policy status quo? “I never thought that I would spend as much time as I do thinking about the fate of failed states and trying to resurrect failed states, trying to resurrect states that were coming out of sustained conflict and trying to use all of the tools of the nation, whether it is foreign assistance or military training or public diplomacy, whatever the elements, to use those elements to try and help build well-governed, democratic states where states were failing.”

I remember hearing an interview with one of NPR's diplomatic correspondents that it has become a strategy of the Bush administration to speak of its legacy as one of policy continuity, rather than rupture from the norm. It appears that they anticipate the past eight years will come to be remembered as a radical departure from the past. Some examples of these ruptures do spring to mind: introducing the doctrine of preemption, eschewing the UN to invade Iraq, breeching international and American law in order to pursue terrorists and the intelligence they hold, wide expansion of the Defense budget and mandate, etc.

Even so, if I were a communications consultant for the Bush administration I would advocate the same spin strategy for the sake Bush's foreign policy legacy: accentuate the positive (continuity), and bury the negative (change). For the Bush administration it's the change that has brought on most of America's foreign policy woes–with the glaring exception being  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whose continuity without resolution causes a great deal of woes to all involved.

Indeed continuity was also the theme of an essay Rice wrote for CFR's academic journal Foreign Affairs titled, “Rethinking The National Interest.”

“…As with previous strategic shocks, one can cite elements of both continuity and change in our foreign policy since the attacks of September 11.

What has not changed is that our relations with traditional and emerging great powers still matter to the successful conduct of policy. Thus, my admonition in 2000 that we should seek to get right the “relationships with the big powers” — Russia, China, and emerging powers such as India and Brazil — has consistently guided us. As before, our alliances in the Americas, Europe, and Asia remain the pillars of the international order, and we are now transforming them to meet the challenges of a new era.

What has changed is, most broadly, how we view the relationship between the dynamics within states and the distribution of power among them. As globalization strengthens some states, it exposes and exacerbates the failings of many others — those too weak or poorly governed to address challenges within their borders and prevent them from spilling out and destabilizing the international order. In this strategic environment, it is vital to our national security that states be willing and able to meet the full range of their sovereign responsibilities, both beyond their borders and within them. This new reality has led us to some significant changes in our policy. We recognize that democratic state building is now an urgent component of our national interest. And in the broader Middle East, we recognize that freedom and democracy are the only ideas that can, over time, lead to just and lasting stability, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq…”

But it's important to look past the spin and try to learn from Secretary Rice's experiences as Secretary of State. If we don't, covering up failed foreign policies with spin could become the new ”element of continuity” that carries on from this  administration into the next.

On Thursday night the House of Representatives passed a vast supplemental spending bill (HR 2642), which would provide $161.8 billion in war funding, an expanded veterans' education benefit, an extension of unemployment insurance and money to deal with flooding in the Midwest. The bill now goes to the Senate for approval, where Democratic leaders have already endorsed it.

This piece of appropriations legislation also provides $1.864 billion for international food and disaster assistance, $696 million for refugee assistance, and $465 million to fund the first year of the “Merida Initiative,” a US-Latin American security partnership aimed at combating drug trafficking.

Upon passage of the bill the House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman said: “"The legislation also includes life-saving aid to refugees and internally displaced persons who have fled the conflicts in Iraq and Darfur.  By granting $475 million more than the Administration asked of us, Congress has done much to respond to the dire needs of people caught up in these crises — and we must continue to do so.”

While this sounds like a big chunk of change, this is merely the tip of the iceberg in terms of foreign assistance modernization. Those concerned about global poverty can thank a new initiative called the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network for bringing Congress’ attention to this issue. 

The network, comprised of development experts from a variety of institutions–think-tanks, universities, etc,–aims to "shape a consensus among a group of leading global development experts on how best to improve America's weak aid infrastructure," and then urge Congress to heed their advice.

Earlier this month Lael Brainard of the Brookings Institution did just that when she released the Network's culminating report at a June 10^th Congressional hearing.  

Titled "New Day New Way: U.S. Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century," the report underscores the need for international development concerns to be on par with those of national security:

"Since September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign assistance has been dominated by national security interests, with a particular focus on fighting terrorism. Security is clearly important, but it should not obscure the equally important imperative of fighting global poverty‚ which is itself a means to address the causes of terrorism and conflict, as well as a host of other urgent challenges. This link between development and sustainable national‚ and, indeed, global‚ security is increasingly recognized by foreign policy, development, and defense experts, and it must be acted upon. But the link is best understood not only as a rationale for providing foreign assistance to strengthen allies in the "war on terror," but as a rationale for supporting development because it leads to a world where capable, open, and economically viable states can act in concert to build a better, safer world."

In a press release, the Network's co-chair Gayle Smith of the Center for American Progress, said: “By giving development a seat at the foreign policy table we can narrow the gap between the world's haves and have nots, tackle the challenges posed by climate change, the global food crisis, and the world's weak and failing states and, most importantly, strengthen the moral foundation from which we lead.”

Next week the House will hold a hearing titled “Foreign Assistance Reform: Rebuilding U.S. Civilian Development and Diplomatic Capacity in the 21st Century,” which will include testimony from two Former Administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development: J. Brian Atwood and M. Peter McPherson. Atwood is also a member of the Network.

 (US Embassy photo)

The US Center for Global Engagement reports that Congress has been making headway in a discussion about how improving how to improve the process by which the US doles out aid money to foreign countries. The Center recently published this review noting Congress's recent action. The review states:

“A wide range of national security and foreign policy experts, academics, think tanks and now Members of Congress are looking at ways to elevate development and modernize America's foreign assistance. After the release of several reports concluding that U.S. foreign assistance needs to be more robust and better coordinated, Members of Congress are beginning to add their voice to the debate.

Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has indicated that next year the committee will take up reauthorization of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act.  His counterpart, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Joseph Biden (D-DE), is also interested in pursuing this matter.

Reps. Betty McCollum (D-MN) and Christopher Shays (R-CT) are planning to introduce a resolution in Congress recognizing the importance of modernizing the U.S. Government's foreign assistance capability and calling for a concerted effort by Congress to address this issue.  Together, all agree on the need for greater investments in foreign assistance and a modernized aid structure to more effectively address the complex global challenges of the 21st century.

Over the last six months, three significant reports on modernizing U.S. foreign assistance have been released. More than 55 foreign policy experts from a broad range of backgrounds contributed to the Lugar Report, Smart Power Committee Report and the HELP Commission Report, and reflect a growing, bipartisan consensus among policy makers, echoed recently by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that global development and diplomacy must play an integral role in our nation's foreign policy and national security strategy.

All three reports come to one important conclusion , the need to elevate U.S. foreign assistance as a strategic tool for the United States.  Additionally, all three reports:

• Recommend increased funding for the International Affairs Budget;
• Propose new structures for administering and delivering foreign aid;
• Identify the need to increase the civilian capacity the agencies involved in U.S. foreign assistance; and
• Recognize the need for more strategic coordination and a better balance between civilian and military engagement overseas.”

This article published on OneWorld also reviews recent action by Congress to revamp US assistance efforts.

Indeed attention on this issue continues. Yesterday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection held a two-panel hearing on policy options for US Disaster Assistance . It included testimony from USAIS's Deputy Acting Administrator,  Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaryof the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs. The second panel included testimony by representatives from the UN, International Crisis Group, and Council on Foreign Relations.

The Los Angeles Times has begun publishing a series of opinion pieces from US aid experts on how the US can use food aid as a tool for diplomacy. The first installment “Feed to Lead,” authored by the Bookings Institution's Lael Brainard and Noam Unger, argues:

“As favorable opinions of the U.S. have suffered in recent years ‚ an issue reflected in commentary on these pages ‚ we must refashion the image we present to the world by retooling the way we seek to influence it. Our consciences, our hearts, and our faith demand that we tackle deprivation because it is the right thing to do. But our assistance does more than help the poor gain access to shelter, medicine, sustenance, education, and opportunity, and it certainly does more than make Americans feel good: it also makes the world feel good about America. When the United States leads in helping lift the lives of the poor, we enhance our own influence and authority in the world community ‚ building support for U.S. interests in other areas. ”

Career Foreign Service Officer James DeHart discusses whether the diplomatic corps have become too militarized in an op-ed in the Washington Posttoday.

Noting the large numbers of diplomats who have volunteered for war-zone appointments in Afghanistan and Iraq, DeHart says:

“This surge in war-zone assignments is an extension of the “transformational diplomacy” for which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called in a 2006 speech at Georgetown UniversityShe said then that Foreign Service officers must learn to partner more directly with the military. True, no doubt, but as they have done so, these new ties have raised fears that diplomacy itself is becoming militarized.”

DeHart queries: “…While expertise in military affairs is a good thing, should it overshadow all else in a world of shifting challenges — climate change, energy security and the threat of global pandemics, to name just a few? As China buys up U.S. debt by the billions, let's hope that some U.S. diplomats are reading the Financial Times and not just Sun Tzu.

Today, we’re seeing not only transformational diplomacy but also the transformation of diplomacy. Foreign Service officers emerging from war zones are in many cases being promoted ahead of their peers. This is understandable, but as they rise up the chain and gain a bigger say in future personnel decisions, the practitioners of more “traditional” diplomacy may find themselves relegated to an even slower track.”

He predicts: “As a bumper sticker, transformational diplomacy is bound to be peeled away by the next administration. But as a set of ideas, it's here to stay. Foreign Service officers have always been the first to say that they can't be cooped up in foreign ministries or fortress embassies — that they need to be out on the street, engaging with diverse communities.

Here's a startling statistic: “In recent years, the number of Foreign Service assignments categorized as “unaccompanied” — that is, too dangerous for families — has surged from 200 to 900. If the trend continues, new recruits may no longer view the Foreign Service as a career but as something to do for a few years before settling down to real life — a bit like the Peace Corps, minus the peace. In a recent survey by the American Foreign Service Association, 44 percent of active Foreign Service officers said that “developments in the last few years” have made it less likely that they will remain in the Foreign Service for a full career.”

He concludes: “A Foreign Service that knows its strengths and conducts diplomacy without apology will be locked and loaded to advance America's place in the world.”

Well said. It is important to recognize these transformations occurring in the nature of US’ diplomacy. I do hope DeHart is wrong in suggesting that the State Department might react to the upsurge in military posts by measuring new Foreign Service Officers against the military's yard-stick. While the military and our diplomatic corps must work together, one needn't morph into the other.

The Pew Global Attitudes Project released today a large global public opinion poll that ties in nicely with my post yesterday about the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee report on views of the US. Here's a chart that shows the decline in favorable views of the US around the world since 1999:

Today the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight released the culmination of ten hearings all based on global views of the US. The report, titled "The Decline in America's Reputation: Why?” explores this important issue, thoroughly-documented with testimony from some of the country's brightest public opinion and regional experts.

The report identifies eight main findings about the levels, trends, and causes of international opinion of American policies, values, and people:

…..click here to read more

President Bush began a five-country European tour on Monday, his last trip to Europe as President. The pre-take-off remarks he made to the Washington press corps on what he hopes to acheive there can be read here and watched here.

Bush kicked off the trip with an annual European Council summit in Slovenia. While the subject of the talks ranged from human rights, to climate change to European affairs, but Bush's aim was squarely focused on pressuring Iran to abandon its nuclear program.  A summary of the declaration passed at the summit can be read here.

The trip comes at a point where Europeans’ opinion of Bush are lower than that of Americans–despite efforts on the part of the President to reachout to European leaders. Many of these leaders already see Bush as a “lame duck,” and hope that the next President will usher in a new phase in transatlantic relations. 

But a recent International Herald Tribune article reminds:

“The one-day meeting will also show that many areas of friction will remain, no matter who is elected to the White House. “It will be easier to work with a new administration,” said one EU official who deals with trans-Atlantic relations speaking on condition of anonymity, “but the best way not to lose your illusions is not to have too many to start with.”

European newspaper editors told PRI's The World radio program yesterday what issues they consider most desreving of Bush's attention, and what they think Mr. Bush's legacy will be.

The Center for U.S. Global Engagement, a Washington-based group that seeks to strengthen America's commitment to global engagement, has launched a new web-based talk show about global issues called “The Global Wire.”

So far the show has hosted Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Aside from discussing current US foreign policy both statesmen were on the show to promote their new books; Hagel's Tough Questions, Straight Answers, and Albright's Memo to the President Elect: How We Can Restore America's Reputation and Leadership.

In Albright's interview she emphasized that in order to get the US out of the “mess” it finds itself in it “has to be engaged internationally, that we don't have the luxury of kind of pulling up the moat, and bridge, and really being behind our borders, and that we have to be fully engaged, but not unilaterally.”

To her engagement means: “…talking to everybody. Understanding what their national interest is, listening, and so it does not mean military invasion or just the use of the military power… Engaging means that you in fact listen and really understand what's going on in other countries to see how their national interest works for ours.”

So that means Albright advocates talking to Iran: “Iran, I would say talk to them. Dialogue with Iran, and understand that dialogue is not always just being sweet and nice, but understanding again what is, understanding a very complex society of Iran.

Albright also discussed the politics of foreign aid, fighting poverty, the empowerment of women and other key issues in US foreign policy.

Looks like the Global Wire is a webpage worth keeping an eye on.

Andy Semmel of the Paternship for a Secure America gives some suggestions on how the U.S. Government could ramp up its global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. His suggestions are entirely focused on improvements that could be made at the State Department.

This is not surprising, considering Semmel served for more than four years as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation at the State Department. Here's an address he gave in that capacity on the same issue to a National Strategy Forum in 2005.

Semmel gives detailed, constructive advice on how the Department could make some structural reorganizations that  stand to greatly improve US action to counter nuclear proliferation. Here is an excerpt from Semmel's article, though I reccomend reading the whole thing.

“The State Department must change its cultural biases against multilateral diplomacy and transnational activities.  State has a strong preference for service in the geographic bureaus and foreign country posts, but service in functional or transnational bureaus and international organizations is seen with disfavor.  The Department doesn't staff the regional bureaus or foreign country missions with skills involved in nonproliferation and arms control negotiations,  and prefers conducting our diplomacy through bilateral, rather than through multilateral channels or in international institutions.  This attitude has been especially pronounced in recent years, but it has been a cultural attribute of the Department for years.

State's institutional culture makes it difficult to recruit Foreign Service Officers to serve in functional bureaus.  Foreign Service Officers who serve repeated assignments in functional bureaus are generally not promoted as rapidly and frequently opt to terminate their careers early, thus depriving the Foreign Service and the United States government of the expertise and experience they have accumulated over the years.

To tackle these cultural biases directly would be very difficult and would take a long time to implement because they are part of the core make-up of the Department.

A potentially more rewarding option would involve a fundamental change in organizational structure, by creating a separate independent or semi-independent entity‚ inside or outside the Department ,that would be guaranteed a seat at the table in important decisions.  A separate agency(modeled perhaps after the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)) would work in tandem with the State Department but possibly report directly to the Secretary of State and the President, with inter-agency coordination managed by a senior member of the National Security Council.  This type of re-structuring would elevate the role of the agency and its head above the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary, could give the agency more clout in inter-agency and international negotiations, give more weight to multilateral diplomacy than it now has, and yield greater influence over its funding needs.

Of course, changing basic organizational structure‚ especially doing so frequently‚ is not without cost or challenges. There have been two major reorganizations in the structure and management of arms control and nonproliferation policy in the State Department in the past ten years.  The next administration will want to weigh carefully the possible costs of undertaking a third major realignment, whatever its intrinsic merits, as it begins to organize itself.

A less risky option for improving the conduct of our nonproliferation and arms control diplomacy would involve organizational reforms.   Several organizational and personnel changes could improve the conduct of our nonproliferation and arms control policy:

(1) More programmatic funding.  Current spending for nonproliferation and arms control in the 150 NADR account is less than one percent of the Department's overall budget.

(2) The ISN (International Security and Nonproliferation) bureau needs authorization for additional permanent personnel so that it doesn't have to rely less on temporary or part time staff to manage key issue-areas.

(3) The FSI (Foreign Service Institute) should add more courses on multilateral diplomacy and on nonproliferation and arms control to its training curriculum.

(4) The Foreign Service should include assignment(s) in functional bureaus as a required part of the Foreign Service career path.

(5) The Department should consider resurrecting the Foreign Service Reserve Officer program, or something similar, to recruit specialists for skills difficult to fill, such as physical and natural scientists needed to tackle the complexities of nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation and arms control.

(6) Re-writing the mission statement of the Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security to place it on a par with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to strengthen the internal trade-offs involving the nonproliferation/arms control agenda.