(Secretary Rice at a press conference in June in Lebanon, courtesy of the State Department)

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations’ International Affairs Fellows Conference last week. An edited video of her remarks can be viewed here.

The thrust of Rice's speech centered on the “elements of continuity” thatthe Bush administration's foreign policy has with that of past administrations. Her first example is maintenance of the US alliance with “big powers” Russia and China:

“For instance, coming in, I think everybody understood that it would be important to have workable relationships with the great powers, the big powers in international politics — China, Russia, the newly emerging powers like India and South Africa and Brazil. Important not just because one wants to have fruitful and constructive relations with important powers, but fruitful and constructive relations that can be put to use in carrying out the work of diplomacy and, therefore, solving international problems.

It goes without saying that it is not really feasible to solve many of the problems of international politics through diplomacy if you cannot find at least common interest and common cause with countries like China and Russia, even if you are not doing so from the basis of common values. And having constructive relations with those two giant powers, both members of the Security Council, has been an important part of what we’ve tried to do.

They are, of course, somewhat different. I think that in many ways managing the relationship with Russia has been one of finding common cause on many, many issues while recognizing that in a complex relationship there are going to be many differences and doing so, frankly, in an atmosphere in which perhaps there has been some disappointment that we have not been able to move closer to the common values with Russia that one would have thought possible in 2000.

In fact, it is the internal development of Russia away from a more democratic course that has been, in some ways, the hardest part of managing the relationship. Nonetheless, we have been able to do important things together in nuclear nonproliferation, in working together on Iran and working together on North Korea, in working together on the Middle East in ways that, I think, would have been unthinkable at the time of the Soviet Union.

And so one of the most important things to remind ourselves of almost every day is that however complex the relationship may be with Russia, however difficult sometimes, however difficult Moscow can make it with rhetoric that is, shall I say, outside, it is nonetheless a relationship that is quite unalike our relationship with the Soviet Union. Russia is not the Soviet Union. And reminding ourselves that the scope for cooperation with Russia is far wider and far greater than anything that we ever experienced with the Soviet Union is important to having a solid relationship with Russia going forward. This is embodied in a strategic framework agreement that Presidents Bush and Putin signed at Sochi, which I think shows the breadth of our relationship with Russia…”

The second element of foreign policy continuity Rice mentions is the strengthening of US  alliances. She names the US’ alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia before focusing on NATO, an alliance that she says has been “truly transformed.”

Noting that most Cold War scholars wondered whether NATO would find a purpose for itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rice says that now:

“The remarkable thing is not only is NATO alive, but it is a fundamentally transformed organization for a couple of reasons. First and foremost, because now 12 of the 26+2, the 28 — soon-to-be 28 members of NATO, 12 of them are former captive nations. And they come to the Alliance with a zeal and a love for democracy that can only be the case if you are still very close to your experience with tyranny. And they have changed the nature of the Alliance. And they’ve changed its agenda. And they’ve kept at the forefront the values of the Alliance.

The Alliance is also different because it is taking on new challenges, most extraordinarily well out of area, as we used to talk about, as it takes on the efforts in Afghanistan, as it helps with planning in Darfur, as it helps with training of Iraqi officers and as it builds global relationships with countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea. NATO is a very-much-changed organization.

It's had its ups and downs. I know that there's been a lot of discussion about how it's doing in Afghanistan. I think it's remarkable that it's in Afghanistan. And of course, as it has been developing its capabilities, it is getting better at fighting the tough counterinsurgency fights that we see in these parts of the world, fights that blur the lines between war and peace where very often you’re clearing an area and bringing in economic reconstruction at the same time. This is hard work. It's different than what we’ve done before. And so perhaps it's not surprising that NATO has had to adjust to this.

It is also an alliance that has suffered from the fact that many European armies, European militaries took the peace dividend very deeply and, as a result, cut their defense budgets, cut their capability. And NATO is now trying to rebuild some of that capability….”

What came as a surprise to Rice as she tried to maintain the foreign policy status quo? “I never thought that I would spend as much time as I do thinking about the fate of failed states and trying to resurrect failed states, trying to resurrect states that were coming out of sustained conflict and trying to use all of the tools of the nation, whether it is foreign assistance or military training or public diplomacy, whatever the elements, to use those elements to try and help build well-governed, democratic states where states were failing.”

I remember hearing an interview with one of NPR's diplomatic correspondents that it has become a strategy of the Bush administration to speak of its legacy as one of policy continuity, rather than rupture from the norm. It appears that they anticipate the past eight years will come to be remembered as a radical departure from the past. Some examples of these ruptures do spring to mind: introducing the doctrine of preemption, eschewing the UN to invade Iraq, breeching international and American law in order to pursue terrorists and the intelligence they hold, wide expansion of the Defense budget and mandate, etc.

Even so, if I were a communications consultant for the Bush administration I would advocate the same spin strategy for the sake Bush's foreign policy legacy: accentuate the positive (continuity), and bury the negative (change). For the Bush administration it's the change that has brought on most of America's foreign policy woes–with the glaring exception being  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whose continuity without resolution causes a great deal of woes to all involved.

Indeed continuity was also the theme of an essay Rice wrote for CFR's academic journal Foreign Affairs titled, “Rethinking The National Interest.”

“…As with previous strategic shocks, one can cite elements of both continuity and change in our foreign policy since the attacks of September 11.

What has not changed is that our relations with traditional and emerging great powers still matter to the successful conduct of policy. Thus, my admonition in 2000 that we should seek to get right the “relationships with the big powers” — Russia, China, and emerging powers such as India and Brazil — has consistently guided us. As before, our alliances in the Americas, Europe, and Asia remain the pillars of the international order, and we are now transforming them to meet the challenges of a new era.

What has changed is, most broadly, how we view the relationship between the dynamics within states and the distribution of power among them. As globalization strengthens some states, it exposes and exacerbates the failings of many others — those too weak or poorly governed to address challenges within their borders and prevent them from spilling out and destabilizing the international order. In this strategic environment, it is vital to our national security that states be willing and able to meet the full range of their sovereign responsibilities, both beyond their borders and within them. This new reality has led us to some significant changes in our policy. We recognize that democratic state building is now an urgent component of our national interest. And in the broader Middle East, we recognize that freedom and democracy are the only ideas that can, over time, lead to just and lasting stability, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq…”

But it's important to look past the spin and try to learn from Secretary Rice's experiences as Secretary of State. If we don't, covering up failed foreign policies with spin could become the new ”element of continuity” that carries on from this  administration into the next.