U.S. Diplomacy

Just released from Agence France Presse:

“Defense Secretary Robert Gates called for greater funding for U.S. diplomacy and foreign development aid July 15, acknowledging concerns about a “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy.

“Broadly speaking, when it comes to America’s engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is - and is clearly seen to be - in a supporting role to civilian agencies,” he said. “Our diplomatic leaders, be they in ambassadors’ suites or on the State Department’s seventh floor, must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy.”

Gates’ speech was delivered as the keynote address of an event that the US Global Leadership Campaign held yesterday in Washington.

(Bush and Singh at the G-8 Meeting this week in Tokyo) 

The biggest headline emanating from this week’s G-8 summit in Tokyo had nothing to do with poverty alleviation, or climate change. Rather it had to do with negotiations between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh about a nuclear deal three years in the making.

Referred to as the 123 Agreement, the deal would allow the US to sell atomic fuel and technology to India provided that India open its civilian reactors to international inspections by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).

Proponents of this deal say it is a great business opportunity for the US, and would supply India with the equipment it needs to build more nuclear power stations. President Bush has also argued that the deal would have more intangible effect of empowering a friendly democracy (which borders US rival China) that has demonstrated what he sees as nuclear responsibility.

Opponents say: “It rewards India with civil nuclear help even though Delhi, which has refused to sign the (Nuclear Non-Proliferation) treaty, acquired nuclear weapons. In doing so, it weakens the treaty’s central bargain: that the original five nuclear powers (the US, UK, France, China and Russia) would help non-nuclear weapons states with civil power provided their ambitions stopped there.”

Critics are skeptical that India’s nuclear ambitions, will, in fact stop there–especially since India has already acquired nuclear weapons. Some critics even say that the deal could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia, or at the very least weaken campaigns to halt other nations’ (on the axis of evil, who shall remain nameless) nuclear enrichment programs. 

After Bush and Singh’s discussions at the G-8 summit, Prime Minister Singh announced that it will hold up his end of the bargain and comply with IAEA inspections, thereby declaring India’s intention to move forward with the deal.

The US Ambassador to India, David Mulford, saidin a reactionary statement: ”The US welcomes the government of India’s initiative to move forward with the US-India civil nuclear deal by seeking the IAEA approval for its safeguards agreement,” and said the US government will work closely with New Delhi, the IAEA, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and the US Congress to implement it “as quickly as possible.”

But there have been two major factors working against the deal and particularly come to a head now that signing the deal into law is in sight. First, domestic opposition within India may shut down not only the deal, but kick PM Siingh out of office altogether.  This week the left-wing parties in the Indian parliament quit the Prime Minister’s coalition over fears that the deal would ”give Washington too much influence over Indian foreign policy.” Hereis the text of the left parties’ grievances in regards to the deal. It states:

“The UPA Government came into existence in 2004 with the support of the Left parties on the basis of its Common Minimum Programme. The aim was to fight the communal forces and undo the damage they had done to the secular polity of India in their years in office. This required a set of interlinked policies to bring relief to the people, to protect India’s integrity and to pursue an independent foreign policy. By going ahead with the deal at a time when there is the crushing burden of price-rise and galloping inflation, the Manmohan Singh Government has clearly shown that it is more concerned about fulfilling its commitment to the Bush administration rather than meeting its commitment to the people of India.”

Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (and a Senior Advisor to the State Department on, among other things, the India-US nuclear deal) talked to NPR last week about how Indian concerns for maintaining independence, or rather its sovereignty, from other nations has created a stiff opposition to the deal within India. He gives some other interesting insights into the deal as well.

Yesterday the Prime Minister set the date of a vote of confidence in the Parliament, which, if lost, could force his government into early elections after four years in power, and scuttle the nuclear deal entirely.

The second, considerably formidable obstacle to sealing the India-UN nuclear deal is time and the US Congress (not a good mix). The BBC reports that the IAEA and the NSG may not bless the deal with enough time for Congress to pass the legislation required to make the deal US law before Congress closes the 2008 session in November. 

After that point, it’s hard to tell whether the incoming Presidential administration will share President Bush’s support for the nuclear pact. The AP reports, for example, “Christine Fair, a South Asia specialist at the RAND Corp., said that “the underbelly of this deal, as Bush envisioned it, was that, with our help, India was going to become a global power, and that meant becoming a global nuclear power. I just don’t know if McCain or Obama are going to embrace that.”

So far Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama has come out in supportof it. McCain’s position is unknown to me. Either way, according to Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution argues that either candidate, once President, may throw in some extra challenges to the Indian side of the deal.

It will be a race to confidence if this deal is to go through. I, personally, will root for sovereignty and time to come out on top.

Former Secretaries of State James A. Baker III (1989 to 1992) and Warren Christopher (1993 to 1997), wearing their hats as the co-chairmen of the National War Powers Commission, authored an op-ed in the New York Times yesterday, arguing on behalf of the findings of their commission’s recent report.

They write:

“The most agonizing decision we make as a nation is whether to go to war. Our Constitution ambiguously divides war powers between the president (who is the commander in chief) and Congress (which has the power of the purse and the power to declare war). The founders hoped that the executive and legislative branches would work together, but in practice the two branches don’t always consult. And even when they do, they often dispute their respective powers.

A bipartisan group that we led, the National War Powers Commission, has unanimously concluded after a year of study that the law purporting to govern the decision to engage in war — the 1973 War Powers Resolution — should be replaced by a new law that would, except for emergencies, require the president and Congressional leaders to discuss the matter before going to war. Seventy years of polls show that most Americans expect Congress and the president to talk before making that decision, and in most cases, they have done so.”

After discussing the pluses of their proposed statute, they conclude: “When it comes to war, Americans deserve better than a law that is ineffective and ignored. They deserve a law that will encourage future presidents and Congresses to work together to protect our nation.”

Another former Secretary of State,  Colin Powell  spoke to a group of young people at the Center for International and Strategic Studies this week. He was the keynote speaker at the kickoff event of a new CSIS initiative called “Next America” aimed at getting young people engaged in international affairs in advance of the Presidential election and beyond. You can watch the entire event by clicking here.

His remarks touched on a variety of issues related to US foreign policy. In regards to the US role in international affairs, Powell said “The only three nations capable of confronting the US militarily are Russia, India and China, and all three want to have good relations with the US.”

The ongoing theme of his talk was wealth creation, and how it is going to be the driving force of the world for better or worse. He emphasized that it needs to be is used wisely in order to make the world a peaceful place.

In a lighter moment, in an attempt to reach out to his youthful audience, Powell admitted to “Google”-ing himself, to demonstrate that he too is part of the “digital” area.

Note to General Powell: since you will probably come across this post at some point in your searching, I apologize for calling out your self-Googling habit. Not to worry, we all have Googled ourselves at one time or another. The fact that you do too gives the rest of us a way to identify with you on a broader level. And it illustrated the point in your talk about the digital revolution well.

Former Ambassador Chas Freeman addressed the World Affairs Council in Washington, DC last week. The title of his talk: “America In the World: Magoo at the Helm.” His remarks provide a sobering, yet extremely important account of the changes afloat in the international realm.

I’ll let the Ambassador speak for himself.

“A great many governments abroad now fear that Washington will behave like the ever-self-congratulatory Mr. Magoo – wandering destructively through a reality he misperceives and wreaking havoc he determinedly misinterprets as success. Few believe that our country can still combine realism with statesmanship. More tellingly, a lot have concluded that, far from involving the United States, dispensing with a role for Washington is the only way to solve problems.”

The Ambassador related US foreign policy to the Middle East, his region of expertise, as an example of this recent phenomenon. He goes on to say:

“This is not just because Mr. Magoo has seemingly succeeded Uncle Sam at the helm. In some measure, it’s because the United States has taken sides in disputes with respect to which we had traditionally maintained at least a pretense of evenhandedness. We are therefore seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It is because promiscuous efforts by the United States to impose military solutions on problems that force cannot resolve have left no room for American diplomacy.

The resulting default on reality-based problem-solving by the US has created a diplomatic void that others are now filling. This trend toward working around the United States has been aggravated by widespread distaste for the arrogant and insulting phrasing of some US policy pronouncements. The undisguised disdain of some American envoys for the United Nations, the World Court, and regional organizations, and their open contempt for the views of the international communities these represent has also disinclined others to work with us if they can avoid it. Washington’s political marginalization in the Middle East is a predictable result of such “diplomacy-free foreign policies…”

…Scofflaw US behavior, the ill-considered uses of military power in wars of unilateral choice, and the contraction of freedom in the American homeland have indeed transformed our relationship with the world – but to our grave disadvantage. Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantánamo and the practice of “extraordinary rendition” have dishonored our traditions and defiled our international reputation. Militarism has debilitated our alliances, friendships, and partnerships and corroded our ability to lead. The belligerently surly, unwelcoming face we present to would-be visitors in our embassies and at our borders puts off even the most determined admirers of our society. The elements of a garrison state we have put in place at home have enfeebled our ability to inspire others with our ideas while depriving us of theirs. Much of the world is now seriously disenchanted with the United States. Most (though not all) of these self-inflicted wounds derive from our response to the atrocities of 9/11 and our policies toward the Middle East. We have shown not only that we can shoot ourselves in the foot, but that we can reload with exceptional speed and do it again and again.”

I strongly reccomend reading the rest of the speech.

Last week–as the Bush administration sees it– diplomacy came out victorious in the standoff between North Korea (aka the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and the five other ”parties” attempting to halt its nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang submitted an accounting of its nuclear arsenals to the Chinese government–a first step in reigning in the nuclear weapons program North Korea declared to be persuing back in 2003. To further demonstrate its intentions, on Friday the DPRK exploded the cooling tower of one of its main nuclear reactors.

In turn, the US removed North Korea from the “Axis of Evil,” more specifically, from its list of state-sponsors of terrorism, as well as the lifting of some economic sanctions. As President Bush remarked in the rose garden after the DPRK’s declaration:

“The six-party talks are based on a principle of “action for action.” So in keeping with the existing six-party agreements, the United States is responding to North Korea’s actions with two actions of our own: First, I’m issuing a proclamation that lifts the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to North Korea. And secondly, I am notifying Congress of my intent to rescind North Korea’s designation as a state sponsor of terror in 45 days.”

Condoleezza Rice sounded triumphant in a Wall Street Journal column published the day of the declaration titled ”Diplomacy is Working on North Korea:”

“If North Korea chooses cooperation – by fulfilling its pledge from the September 2005 Joint Statement to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” – a path is open for it to achieve the better and more secure relationship it says it wants with the international community. That includes the U.S. We have no permanent enemies.”

The declration could be considered a victory for diplomacy not only because diplomacy was the method employed to reach the deal, but also because the US’ diplomatic agency (the State Department) beat out the White House to change to course of US policy toward North Korea after much wrangling on this issue. According to the New York Times:

“In the internal Bush administration war between the State Department and Mr. Cheney’s office over North Korea, Secretary of State Condoleezza Riceand her top North Korea envoy, Christopher R. Hill, won a major battle against the Cheney camp when President Bush announced Thursday that he was taking the country he once described as part of the “axis of evil” off the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The administration sought to portray the move as a largely symbolic, reciprocal move, made in return for North Korea’s long-delayed declaration of its nuclear program to the outside world. It is the first step in what will be a long, drawn-out diplomatic process that is meant to lead eventually to establishing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula…

…Thursday’s announcement intensified a pitched battle in Washington, where Democrats and many foreign policy experts said the administration had dithered too long before reaching this deal, allowing North Korea to acquire enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons. From the other side of the fence, conservative hard-liners complained that the United States gave away too much for too little, and should have adopted a more absolutist approach with the secretive North Korean government.”

But for many critics, diplomacy won too little too late. Again the New York Times’ Helene Cooper explains:

“Accusing the North Koreans of violating a previous diplomatic accord on ending its nuclear program, called the Agreed Framework, which was negotiated during the Clinton administration, Mr. Bush pulled out of talks with North Korea in 2002 and pressed to isolate the North Korean government. The abandonment of talks gave North Korea greater leeway to produce plutonium and become a nuclear power, critics say.

Had Mr. Bush instead stuck with a diplomatic course, the critics say, North Korea might not have acquired enough plutonium to make a nuclear weapon.

“What is absolutely clear is the decision they took in 2002 to terminate the Agreed Framework gave North Korea the opening” to kick international inspectors out of its Yongbyon nuclear plant and press ahead with its work on the bomb, said Carlos Pascual, director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. “That was the tragedy of the Bush administration’s policy,” Mr. Pascual said. “That by opting for terminating our engagement, we opened the door to North Korea’s becoming a nuclear power.”

On the other hand, John Bolton, a former Ambassador to the UN and old Bush administration hand, said of the declaration ““This is a sad, sad day… I think Bush believes what Condi is telling him, that they’re going to persuade the North to give up nuclear weapons, and I don’t think that’s going to happen. I think we’ve been taken to the cleaners.”

Steve Clemmons, foreign policy expert at the New America Foundation, captures the contradictions in this victory” for diplomacy, and gives credit where credit is due:

“This is huge news– and is a giant step in putting US-North Korea relations on a new and more constructive track. This is a success for the Bush administration– and more importantly for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacfic Affairs Christopher Hill who has been a punching bag for former US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton who has been spitting on Hill’s deal-making for the last year.

There are still a lot of questions ranging from the interesting issue of North Korea cooperation with Syria’s alleged nuclear facility that was destroyed by Israel and other issues — but when President Bush gave Colin Powell the positive nod in the first week of April 2003 to proceed with the Six Party Talks, Bush and Cheney ignored Iran’s offer of a structure for normalized US-Iran relations the very same week in 2003.

The contrast in circumstances between where America is today with North Korea and where we are with Iran is vital to note. We ‘engaged’ North Korea and blew it with Iran.

Congrats to Christopher Hill, John Negroponte, Condoleezza Rice, the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns and his successor William Burns. And for those who want to knock China around, they should know that this entire process was impossible without China’s impressive, collaborative diplomacy.”

Clemmons talks more about the implications of this move in this video: