U.S. Diplomacy

The United Nations Foundation released a public opinion poll this week, focusing on Americans’ foreign policy priorities. The headline: “New Opinion Research Shows American Voters Reject “Going It Alone”, Embrace International Cooperation.”

From the press release:

“An underlying shift is occurring in American attitudes regarding the international role and priorities of the United States. Voters across the party spectrum understand that America’s reputation has faltered, and believe this is a problem for the nation that needs attention and repair,” said Timothy E. Wirth, President of the United Nations Foundation.

…Our research shows that Americans overwhelmingly support policies that promote a balance of military strength and diplomacy, and to prioritize international cooperation, instead of going it alone to advance our interests,” said Wirth.

Seventy-six percent of Republicans and Democrats and 70% of swing voters selected “a balance of toughness and diplomacy” as one of the top three attributes of the next president. Both Republicans (86%) and swing voters (74%) also chose keeping “America safe and secure” as a top attribute.

Working with organizations such as the United Nations and with other countries to tackle global terrorism was a priority attribute for Democrats (73%).”The overwhelming majority of American voters believe that America’s reputation has suffered in the world. 78% of all voters believe the United States is less respected by other countries than it has been in the past.

80% of voters believe that working with major allies, and through international organizations, is a wiser strategy for achieving U.S. international affairs goals.”

View the full research findings here.

With the aid of hindsight, we can now understand that the Russia-Georgia conflict over South Ossetia wasthe product of miscalculations and misperceptions on the part of both the Georgian and Russian leadership.

But to many the conflict reveals much about the current state of international affairs, and provides a base from which the US can calculate its future foreign policy toward Russia. Let’s investigate some of these arguments.

First, an International Crisis Group report argues: “The Russia-Georgia conflict has transformed the contemporary geopolitical world, with large consequences for peace and security in Europe and beyond…

…Russia’s disproportionate counter-attack, with movement of large forces into Abkhazia and deep into Georgia, accompanied by the widespread destruction of economic infrastructure, damage to the economy and disruption of communications and movement between different regions of the country, constitutes a dramatic shift in Russian-Western relations.

It has undermined regional stability and security; threatened energy corridors that are vital for Europe; made claims with respect to ethnic Russians and other minorities that could be used to destabilise other parts of the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine a potential target; and shown disregard for international law.”

The authors explain: “Russian actions reflected deeper factors, including pushback against the decade-long eastward expansion of the NATO alliance, anger over issues ranging from the independence of Kosovo to the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, an assertion of a concept of limited sovereignty for former Soviet states and a newfound confidence and aggressiveness in foreign affairs that is intimately linked with the personality and world view of Russia’s predominant leader, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.”

The next few arguments focus on the future of US-Russia relations. Michael O’Hanlon, in a analysis writtenfor the Brookings Institution, the Washington-based think tank for which he works,  wonders what “Western actions or policies should be modified in the future to avoid worsening the problem [of Russia’s “bullying” of Georgia].”

He suggests that US foreign policy towards Russia shouldn’t focus too much on the little stuff: “securing Russia’s cooperation in opposing Iran’s march toward a nuclear weapon, pressuring North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal, and trying to keep the peace in South and Central Asia are top-level priorities. We make a mistake by needlessly picking fights over secondary things if that harms our ability to cooperate on truly crucial matters.”

In regards to the future of US-Russian relations O’Hanlon states:

“We are in a predicament. To continue down the path of likely NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would risk causing even worse troubles with Russia over a second-tier geostrategic issue when we need Moscow’s help in first-tier issues (not to mention the fact that were Georgia in NATO and then again attacked by Russia we would have a huge and dangerous predicament on our hands).

Yet we cannot capitulate to Russian bullying and deny Georgia and Ukraine membership out of fear, either.

In this situation, two principles should guide further U.S. action. First, we should avoid rushing to do anything. The best policy will avoid committing to major, enduring decisions on matters such as NATO membership, since it is time for tempers to cool and provocations to cease among Georgians and Russians.

Second, we need a new concept for expanding NATO. Perhaps it is time to consider Russian membership - not now, of course, and probably never with Mr. Putin or Mr. Medvedev in power, but someday. At least Russia might be offered the option, assuming it satisfies NATO membership criteria, even as we emphasize to Moscow’s future leaders that they will have no veto over the possible membership of others.”

Third, Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and a seasoned diplomat, gives the next President some advice on how to handle Russia come January in an article published in this week’s Newsweek magazine.

“Russia may no longer be a superpower, but despite its declining population, it remains a major power, one in a position to influence the opening decades of the 21st century. Russia possesses approximately half the world’s nuclear weapons, is the largest producer of natural gas and the second largest producer of oil, is a major exporter of modern arms, holds dollar reserves nearing $300 billion and, with its seat on the U.N. Security Council, is positioned to facilitate or frustrate a good deal of U.S. foreign policy…

…The Bush administration has said that so long as Russia occupies parts of Georgia there will be no return to “business as usual” in U.S.–Russian relations. This suggests a form of linkage, a policy from the cold war, where bilateral ties across the board are adversely affected because of disagreement over a particular issue, in this case Georgia. This is a questionable strategy for the United States at a time when so much else on our agenda involves Russia. Instead, U.S. policy ought to be for the two countries to cooperate where they can—and to disagree and compete within constraints where they must…The goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to get Russia to play by the rules, not try to circumvent them.”

Helena Cobban, with the Friends Committee on National Legislation (the Quaker lobby) in Washington, DC, follows Haas’ theme of cooperation with Russia in a piece she penned for the Christian Science Monitor. The piece focuses less on the post-conflict fall out, and more on the big picture.

Cobban argues: “Russia is back. China has emerged. Suddenly, the United States isn’t the world’s only superpower.

How will these three big powers interact in the years ahead, and what does that mean for all of humanity?

The global architecture that’s emerging will be very different from the cold war. That was a contest between two big powers with clashing visions of how the whole world should be organized, and it centered on a very costly – and risky – nuclear arms race. The emerging framework will probably be anchored by the three large powers and by four others (Europe, Japan, India, and Brazil). And in today’s more globalized world, raw military power has become much less important; economic and “soft” power, more so.

Here’s the good news: The interests of the world’s leading powers are deeply entwined. China and Japan hold large amounts of US debt; Russia supplies much of Europe’s energy needs; markets, investments, and production systems criss-cross national boundaries.

This interdependence makes open warfare among them less likely. A war would be devastating for the whole system – especially for the US, whose military is stretched very thin and whose economy relies on overseas oil and loans.”

It seems, based on these analyses, that a least a little bit of clarity has emerged form the fog of war.

The Democratic Party just released its party platform titled “Renewing America’s Promise.” It will officially be released at the Democratic national Convention in Denver next week. This report encompasses the party’s approach to a whole slew of issues affecting the nation. Watch a party representative discuss the report at an event held at the New America Foundation in Washington last week below:

There’s a lot of material here, so I sifted through the document looking for places where the world “diplomacy” is mentioned. Here’s what I found:

From the Preamble:

“The Democratic Party believes that there is no more important priority than renewing American leadership on the world stage. This will require diplomatic skill as capable as our military might. Instead of refusing to confront our most pressing threats, we will use all elements of American power to keep us safe, prosperous, and free. Instead of alienating our nation from the world, we will enable America –once again –to lead.“

Music to ones’ ears, no?

From the section titled “Renewing American Leadership:”

“The world must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. That starts with tougher sanctions and aggressive, principled, and direct high-level diplomacy, without preconditions…By going the extra diplomatic mile, while keeping all options on the table, we make it more likely the rest of the world will stand with us to increase pressure on Iran, if diplomacy is failing…”

Great use of diplomacy. But the key phrases in this excerpt are “without preconditions” and “while keeping all options on the table.” The preconditions issue has been debated throughout the presidential election with the Republican candidate taking the position that talks with Iran can only be held once certain preconditions are met (for example, saying to Iran: “open up to inspectors first, then we’ll talk”). This has also been the President’s position, much repeated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

The Democratic candidate Barack Obama has taken–and then softened–the position that talks should be held with enemy regimes without setting pre-conditions. The Democratic party apparently supports Senator Obama’s original intent.

The phrase “keeping all options on the table” leaves open the possibility of military against against Iran. That is, if Iran were to refuse to halt its nuclear weapons program, and no diplomatic measure could prevent it from doing so, according to this platform, the US would resort to military action to stop the production of nuclear weapons. This language makes the doves nervous, but delights the hawks. You can guess who the Democrats are tying to please by including that phrase in the report.

So as not to overlook the doves, though, the authors drop the word diplomacy a couple of times in order to reassure those who may be worrying that the US might be gearing up for military conflict Iran, as well as those who may be worried that the US hasn’t learned its lesson about the rush to war after the invasion of Iraq and the aftermath.

From the section titled “Invest in Our Common Humanity:”

“We will modernize our foreign assistance policies, tools, and operations in an elevated,empowered, consolidated, and streamlined U.S. development agency. Development and diplomacy will be reinforced as key pillars of U.S. foreign policy, and our civilian agencies will be staffed, resourced, and equipped to address effectively new global challenges.”

This is a nod to those who have been fighting hard to make sure those in government don’t forget the second and third “D’s” in US foreign policy: Defense, Development, and Diplomacy.

All of the excerpts mentioning the word diplomacy up to this point in the report have been pretty non-controversial, and if I may say, pretty masterful. But the section titled “Stand with Allies and Pursue Diplomacy in the Middle East” might stir up some controversy, or at the very least, some editing. Read this excerpt, and remember that the purpose of this section is to explain how the US will “Stand with Allies (plural) and Pursue Diplomacy in the Middle East:”

“For more than three decades, Israelis, Palestinians, Arab leaders, and the rest of the world have looked to America to lead the effort to build the road to a secure and lasting peace. Our starting point must always be our special relationship with Israel, grounded in shared interests and shared values, and a clear, strong, fundamental commitment to the security of Israel, our strongest ally in the region and its only established democracy.

That commitment, which requires us to ensure that Israel retains a qualitative edge for its national security and its right to self-defense, is all the more important as we contend with growing threats in the region–a strengthened Iran, a chaotic Iraq, the resurgence of Al Qaeda, the reinvigoration of Hamas and Hezbollah…”

[The next three paragraphs discuss more detailed plans for helping resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict].

Now I’m no Middle East policy expert, but doesn’t this section’s seem a little narrow in focus? Don’t get me wrong, the US relationship with Israel is important, and finding a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians is exceptionally important BUT: there 25 countries in the Middle East, and we can definitely count our allies there on more than one hand. How come the only countries mentioned in this section are Israel, Palestine and a vague reference to Iran as a “threat,” and Iraq as “chaotic?”

I fear that the Democratic party’s plan for pursuing diplomacy in the Middle East by focusing solely on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will cause US diplomacy to loose sight of the bigger picture in a region of great strategic importance.

This post collects sage advice for US policy toward the Middle East: one aspect of US foreign policy that could really use a jump-start.

First, a new analysis by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Scholars Marina Ottoway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy.

According to the policy brief, titled “The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.,” Arab countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives that clearly contradict U.S. policy, because they no longer trust the U.S. capacity to contend with escalating regional crises. The authors argue that even Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead on policies toward Iran, Lebanon, or Hamas.

Here are some of the authors’ conclusions:

•While new Arab diplomatic initiatives may contradict current U.S. policy, they may not contravene long-term U.S. interests.

• Arab regional diplomacy lacks an overarching vision and is instead based on a desire to reduce imminent threats.

• Influence in the Arab world has shifted to the Gulf and the change is likely permanent due to increased oil wealth and the crises engulfing other regions.

• The United States and Saudi Arabia, historically close allies, often hope for the same outcome in regional conflicts but pursue different strategies. In trying to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia seeks to avoid confrontation through diplomatic engagement, while the United States favors isolation. Saudi Arabia promotes reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas as a necessary step in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, while the United States refuses to recognize Hamas.

In the end, the authors state that: ”whether the policies of these (Arab) countries will diverge from those of the United States depends as much on U.S. choices as on theirs.”

Second, from the Arab world, an opinion piece  by Rami Khouri, editor-at-large of The Daily Star (Lebanon), offers advice for US policy in the Middle East. He devised a list of ten principles and policies that he believes should define American policies in the Middle East. Here’s a sampling:

1. Politically engage all legitimate actors: The American tendency to boycott or try and destroy major players in the region, like Hizbullah and Hamas, is childish and counter-productive. All those whom the United States has held at arm’s length have tended to become stronger in the region — partly by garnering public support for defying and resisting the United States….

2. Seek peace, security and prosperity for all according to a single standard: Foreign powers in the Middle East must give Arabs, Israelis, Iranians and Turks fully equal weight in terms of their rights and interests, rather than giving some countries priority or even exclusivity in areas like security, nuclear technology, etc.

3. Use multilateral engagement mechanisms more than unilateral military means or threats: The UN and its agencies offer useful, legitimate and effective mechanisms to address contentious issues if they are used regularly, and not whimsically or opportunistically.

4. Be consistent on core issues across the region: Double-standards in enforcing UN resolutions or international conventions, or promoting freedom and democracy, badly erode American credibility, respect and efficacy, severely curtailing US impact and influence over time…”

Finally, an expert on Middle East affairs offers some more general pointers studying the region. Fred Halliday, after teaching Middle Eastern affairs at the London School of Economics for more than 20 years, retired from teaching in March. The latest issue of the LSE alumni magazine includes an essay Halliday authored titled “Shaping the Middle East,” based on a farewell lecture he gave at the university.

In the essay, Halliday offers 5 pointers on how a Westerner should approach studying the Middle East. First, he says one must understand the history of the region: “We need to see the region not in its millennial abstraction and mystifi cation, but as, like Europe, Latin America and East Asia, a product of modern international economic, political and social forces.”

Second, Halliday emphasizes that, as in the study of other regions, the starting point for the study of the Middle East should be the nation-state.

The state, Halliday says, consists of “the institutions of coercion, administration and territorial delimitation: it is states that shape identities, religions, economies. There is no such thing as the Middle Eastern state, the oriental state, the Arab state, the Islamic state: there are entities which rule, coerce, tax, spend, mobilise, in the modern regional and international context in which they find themselves.

 And, equally importantly, it is the desire to control the state, or else to set up their own separate state, as today with the Kurds, Palestinians and Southern Sudanese, and earlier with the Zionist movement in Palestine, that explains the politics of opposition groups, be they democratic, authoritarian or insurrectionary.”

Third is culture: “In the Middle East as elsewhere, issues of culture and religion do matter in explaining political attitudes and behaviour. But culture broadly defined, including religion, does not in itself explain modern politics, social behaviour or international relations… Far too much of the study of the contemporary Middle East takes culture as a given, and as, in social science terms, an independent and explanatory variable, instead of seeing it as itself shaped by modern, domestic and international forces…”

Fourth is the oft-forgotten factor of economics: “If one wants to understand why and how external powers have dominated, partitioned, controlled and intervened in the Middle East, then economic factors remain central to the story, not only in regard to oil and gas extraction, which form the largest industries and the most traded commodities in the world, but also in regard to markets, and, of enormous if often only partly visible importance, to the recycling and reinvestment of oil revenues.”Finally it is imperative to grasp the role that different political actors play in the region. Here Halliday specifically warns against assuming that the region always acts as an integrated whole. He says:

“Even as regional forces are at play, be it in regard to nuclear weapons, migration flows or terrorism, the 25 countries of the region remain distinct and in some ways separated from each other, a system of interacting units but not a homogenous whole.This means that with specific conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, or the Iran-Iraq war, or now the multi-layered war in Iraq, we should be careful how far we see these conflicts as dominating, or defining, the region as a whole.”

Sage advice on a region of supreme importance for US foreign policy.

New York Times veteran columnist Nicholas Kristof weighed in this weekend on what he calls a “cancer in American foreign policy.” He lists the symptoms:

“1) The United States has more musicians in its military bands than it has diplomats.

2) This year alone, the United States Army will add about 7,000 soldiers to its total; that’s more people than in the entire American Foreign Service.

3) More than 1,000 American diplomatic positions are vacant because the Foreign Service is so short-staffed, but a myopic Congress is refusing to finance even modest new hiring. Some 1,100 could be hired for the cost of a single C-17 military cargo plane.

In short, the United States is hugely overinvesting in military tools and underinvesting in diplomatic tools. The result is a lopsided foreign policy that antagonizes the rest of the world and is ineffective in tackling many modern problems.”

On the US counterterrorism strategy Kristof argues: “Our intuitive approach to fighting terrorists and insurgents is to blow things up. But one of the most cost-effective counterterrorism methods in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan may be to build things up, like schooling and microfinance. Girls’ education sometimes gets more bang for the buck than a missile.”

He cites a recent RAND Corporation report studying the dissolution of terrorist organizations. “There is no battlefield solution to terrorism. Military force usually has the opposite effect from what is intended.””

If Kristof’s argument up to here sounds totally obvious and necessary to you, consider another viewpoint. Brian Darling, director of Senate Relations for the conservative Heritage Foundation, had this critique of Senator Barack Obama’s foreign policy platform:

“He clearly leans toward the diplomacy side in world affairs. Foreign aid, agriculture aid, using federal tax dollars to buy a country’s affections is one element of diplomacy. But I hope he realizes that having a strong military is another form of diplomacy.”

I am not quire sure what Darling means by this–a strong military as a form of diplomacy. Here’s one image that comes to mind: this strong military invites a group of foreign dignitaries to the State Department for a diplomatic reception. At the bottom of the invitation, instead of saying “Respondez s’il Vous Plait,” it says, “Be there, or else we’ll kick your butt to smithereens!!”

Or maybe, if a strong military were a form of diplomacy, instead of building bombs and warheads, it could invest billions of dollars to develop a device that would automatically produce the optimal outcome for all parties involved in a given international negotiation . It could be called the “Stealth Consensus Builder 2000″ (I hereby call patent rights!).

In practice, our strong military and our diplomatic corps collaborate frequently and successfully. But I think Kristof–and many others–would agree that they are hardly interchangeable. Kristof’s point is exactly the opposite: too often our strong military has been deployed in place of diplomatic efforts.

What does Kristof suggest as a first step toward recovery? “Let’s agree that diplomats should be every bit as much of an American priority as musicians in military bands.” It’s no Stealth Consensus Builder, but I’ll take it.

It’s not too late to dig into some summer reading. If you have a hankering to read something intellectually dense, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) can help. At the request of the Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs, has put together a “Foreign Affairs Professional Reading List.“

The list aims “to serve as a resource for Foreign Service and Civil Service employees of the foreign affairs agencies,” but the list is befitting of all of us foreign policy buffs.

Since summer is quickly drawing to a close, I’d recommend perusing their “Highly Recommended” list. The New York Times blog about books called “Paper Cuts” had

“The shorter list lends itself to a few observations. The first is that it’s comforting to see the department has its priorities straight. The emphasis in books like Dennis Ross’s “Statecraft” and Joseph Nye’s “Soft Power” is on diplomacy and on what talking and compromise can accomplish in a dangerous world, exactly the perspective we expect the State Department to demonstrate and advocate. Those primarily interested in military solutions to international crises have a different department they can consult for reading recommendations.

Second, and more surprising, the State Department seems willing to entertain the notion that the United States is in fact an empire, with an empire’s problems, a point not often made in official Washington, at least not publicly. So department employees are advised to read Niall Ferguson’s “Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire,” Robert Kagan’s “Dangerous Nation” and Paul Kennedy’s “Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.”

And third, in the long-standing intellectual division between the Realists, who argue that foreign policy should be based on national interest, and Wilsonian moralists, who stress ethical principles as a guide to international relations, the department’s list is weighted strongly on the side of the Realists, with books by Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Richard Haass and John Lewis Gaddis. The most influential Wilsonians of our time — the neoconservatives — are represented only by Kagan (and his book is more about American expansion than American values). There is no Victor Davis Hanson here, no Mark Steyn, no Norman Podhoretz.

All of which is to say that if the White House or the Vice President’s office were to compile a list of recommended reading for their employees, it would look very different indeed.”

I am guessing the compilation of the list had to be a bi-partisan effort, no? Happy reading!

The American Academy of Diplomacy, in partnership with the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) held a panel discussion back in April at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs in Minneapolis to discuss “diplomatic engagement with non-governmental organizations and civil society to promote effective democratic governance.”

The event’s featured speakers were: Ambassador Edwin Corr, former ambassador to Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, former ambassador to Yemen, Ken Wollack, president of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Lorne Craner, president of the International Republican Institute (IRI).

You can watch the entire session here. If you don’t have tons of time, I highly recommend listening to Ambassador Bodine’s remarks about he rexperiences promoting democracy in Yemen.

Bodine spoke about how democratization and stabilization from conflict are not mutually exclusive activities, rather the need to be addressed at the same time. She spoke about her efforts to work with NGOs within Yemen to help them help the country on the path of democratization.

Bodine said: “[one must] Find out where the society wants to go, what are their priorities and then figure out how you [being the US government] support them to move forward.” She said that for this to work, these efforts can’t be focused solely on national security concerns within that country.

Ambassador Corr’s remarks about his experience promoting democracy in El Salvador is also interesting. He related some lessons learned, such as: emphasise civilian rule over military rule, make sure the Salvadorians are in charge of the democratization process, and that it is their style of democracy being implemented, etc.

He said the approach has to be holistic, that is engage our whole government with their whole government, our judges with their judges, but always in a supportive, not dominating role. He also emphasized that embassy staff equipped with language skills is essential. He also said that you can’t start to promote democracy if the country isn’t ready for it yet.

Joe Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held a hearing last week on an important topic in American foreign policy.  In Biden’s words the hearing was called to explore the following question:

“In expanding the role of our armed forces, have we diminished our civilian capabilities - our diplomatic and development assistance institutions—and have we done so in a way that undermines our national security?”

The hearing sought to voice some of the most experienced witnesses of this phenomenon: the Deputy Secretary of State, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, a former committee staffer, and a gaggle of experienced voices from the NGO/think tank sector.

In his opening remarks Biden laid out the reasoning behind the hearing:

“There has been a migration of functions and authorities from U.S. civilian agencies to the Department of Defense. Between 2002 and 2005, the share of U.S. official development assistance channeled through the Pentagon budget surged from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005, rising to $5.5 billion. Much of this increase has gone towards activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it still points to an expanding military role in what were traditionally civilian programs.

I share the concern that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently raised. `The military,’ he said, `has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations…This has led to concern…about what’s seen as a creeping `militarization’…of America’s foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment.”

Biden said the expanding role of the military on US foreign policy is problematic for several reasons: “First, the increasing dominance of the military in our foreign policy may inadvertently limit our options – when the military is the most readily available option, it is more likely to be used, whether or not it is the best choice…

…Finally, militaries are good at winning wars and training armies. But, in my view, we do not want soldiers training lawyers or setting up court systems. Or instructing health-care workers on HIV/AIDS prevention? Or running a micro-finance program? Out of necessity, our men and women in uniform have gotten very good at this. But it is not their primary mission; war-fighting is.”

Biden laid out a series of questions related to this phenomenon that the hearing sought to explore. He then turned it over to Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte (also a former Ambassador to Iraq). Negroponte spoke primarily to Biden’s question on the status of interagency coordination. “By law,” Biden said, “the State Department plays the primary role in overseeing foreign assistance activities. In practice, the Department of Defense is taking on more and more responsibility for traditionally foreign assistance programs. How can we ensure that State plays its proper and necessary role?”

In his testimony, Negroponte echoed both Biden’s and Gates’ assessments of the problem: “The mission to stabilize and reconstruct a nation is one that civilians must lead. But for too long, we have not had sufficient numbers of trained, prepared, and supported civilians who could provide that leadership. As a result, over the past 20 years, over the course of 17 significant stabilization and reconstruction missions in which the United States has been involved, too much of the effort has been borne by our men and women in uniform.”

But Negroponte defended the Defense Department, saying it has taken the appropriate amount of control in foreign assistance operations:

“As we work to increase civilian capacity to perform the diplomatic and development missions demanded by our national security strategy, we are grateful and better off for the Defense Department’s contribution of expertise, personnel, and resources in support of our work.

Our nation is safer and stronger when our lead national security agencies are united in purpose. DoD’s contribution is not only meeting military requirements, but directly advancing the goal of our diplomacy: a world of democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and act responsibly in the international system.”

The Committee also sought the insight of a former colleague–Mary Locke, a retired Senior Professional Staff member for the Committee. Locke discussed an oversight report that she and her colleagues on the committee drafted in 2006 at the request of the Committee’s Ranking Member, Senator Lugar. The report was based on the drafters’ travels to US embassies throughout Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East with the aim of examining the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department.

Although the report is widely acknowledged within government, Locke read the report’s key conclusions for those at the hearing:

1) The number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in non-combat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated. The leadership qualities of the ambassador are a determinative factor in striking a prudent U.S. military posture in our embassies.

2) While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the campaign against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long-term.  It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance.

As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.”

On the budget disparity between Defense and State, Locke pointed out that blame shouldn’t be placed entirely, as some claim, on the Bush Adminstration’s narrow focus on the “war on terror”:

“[In a past report issued in November] we found that during the Bush administration’s tenure up until that time, the Congress had denied some $7.6 billion that the President requested in his regular foreign aid budget. With this track record on the foreign affairs 150 budget account, it should not be a shockingly unexpected development when the executive branch turns to the defense 050 account as an alternative, a budget that is larger by a factor of at least twelve.”

In other words, when Congress denies President’s request for foreign assistance funds placed in the “150 budget account” (which funds the breadth of the State Department’s activities) the President then logically tries to channels funding for that purpose through the more ample Defense Department budget. Hence, Congress’s appropriations have in part promoted the shift of foreign assistance responsibilities towards the better-funded Defense Department.

There is such rich testimony in this hearing I couldn’t possibly cover it all here. I’ll leave you with Mary Locke’s final point, as it relates closely with the subject of this blog:

“This Committee should carry out vigorous oversight on the issue of the role of the military in foreign policy. It is as important to listen to our ambassadors to get a handle on this issue as to officials in headquarters. Studies, hearings such as this, and appropriate legislative and budget decisions will go a long way toward keeping the right balance struck.”

 Looks like Defence Secretary Gates’ call for more support for US “soft power” tools is a view also shared by those under his command.  A new poll of US military officers conducted by the US Global Leadership Campaign shows that they overwhelmingly support diplomatic tools to addressing the variety of security challenges the US faces. A majority of the officers also said that the US is doing too little to strengthen its use of non-military tools.

In a nudge to the State Department’s Bureau of Public Diplomacy, a large majority of the officers agreed (77%) that the degree to which America is respected by people overseas makes a difference to the effectiveness of our military overseas. Furthermore, a 62% majority of officers surveyed rate “restoring respect for America around the world by playing a positive leadership role in addressing major global challenges” as a very important goal.

From the poll’s summary of findings:

𐂃 Today’s military officers believe we face very different security challenges than we did during the Cold War and must use different tools and strategies to address those challenges.

𐂃 A significant majority of officers surveyed embrace a new paradigm in which strengthened diplomacy and development assistance are important companions to traditional military tools for achieving America’s national security goals. 𐂃 A majority of officers serving in the post-9/11 era have seen the benefit of non-military tools such as development assistance and diplomacy firsthand, particularly those deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.

𐂃 These poll results suggest the next Commander in Chief must understand that a strong military alone is not enough to protect America and that military officers believe we must also improve diplomatic relations and do more to promote stability in the world by improving health, education, and economic opportunity in other countries.”

This support for the use of soft power comes from an unlikely, but extremely important source. The military knows that it cannot confront the national security threats of the 21st century without diplomacy in its arsenal.