U.S. Diplomacy

Today is the sixteenth anniversary of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. As Ghosts of Alexander reminds us the United States finds itself battling the radical sentiment it helped proliferate to fight the Soviets.

Pakistan’s President Musharraf, addressing the 88^th National Management Course, noted the growing extremism , which he fears “the spread of Talibansation beyond the Tribal Areas.” The threat to the security of Afghanistan couldn’t be more evident than the assassination attempt on President Karzai earlier today.

All too often analysts, myself included, suggest the solution lies in convincing our allies to provide more troops. Recognizing the numerous difficulties Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, and President Bush have encountered over this very issue leads one to conclude that solution is a pipe dream. Even if this delusion were to become reality, a significant stumbling block hampering the NATO effort stems from the lack of command control, according to the Christian Science Monitor. Such an assertion makes this blogger wonder why six years after the initial invasion there remain questions over authority. Without undisputed orders any “silver bullet” incorporating coalition support bears concern.

The Kojo Nnamdi show, an NPR station based in Washington, DC, hosted a group of foreign policy experts and practitioners in a discussion about the future of the US Foreign Service (FS). (Listen to the show).

All of Kojo’s guests pointed out that the central barrier to a bright future for the FS was the perpetual lack of funding from Congress.

Steven Kashkett, Vice President of the American Foreign Service Association, a lobby organization and labor union for members of the FS, emphasized that the staffing authorizations from Congress failed to suit the needs of the Foreign Service. Because of the lack of funding, the State Department just doesn’t have the people to do the job they need to do. Kojo mentioned that there are less diplomats employed in the FS than there are musicians employed by the Department of Defense.

The guests pointed out that, even when President Bush says he wants to provide the funding to double size of diplomatic corps in the next 10 years, it takes pressure from the Administration on Congress to get those funds fully appropriated. This pressure has not been forcefully applied.

A central issue to funding the FS is: How do you get Members of Congress to care about their needs? As Kashkett explained, “there is no natural constituency.”

Particularly damaging to funding requests is what the guests called a persistent image of US diplomats as “cookie-pushers,” or debutantes living a cushy life on the cocktail circuit. Kaskett emphasized: “Our diplomats have a hard life. Most of us don’t even own a tuxedo.”

Steven Kelly seconded that point. He pointed out that roughly 70% of US diplomats serving abroad are serving in what are called “hardship posts,” posts that present “unusually difficult or unhealthful conditions or severe physical hardships.” Kelly is now a member of the Senior Foreign Service, but when joined the FS in 1982 he said there were “no where near those numbers” of diplomats serving in hardship posts.On top of the lack of funding, former Ambassador and Brookings Institution Vice President Carlos Pascual pointed out that the tasks that the FS undertakes around the world have only gotten harder. Our increasingly interdependent world has changes in the nature of the threats we face. Pascual cited the example of the threats that emanate from failed states like Afghanistan, in addition to threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, narco-traffickers. To confront these threats diplomats need to be on the frontline, and this is no longer in state capitols, the traditional geographic targets of FS operations.

Increasing the demands on the FS is their boss’ own mandate. Condoleezza Rice began her tenure as Secretary of State by declaring the goal of the US diplomatic corps to be none other than “transformational diplomacy,” a term that has come to mean that the FS should come to play a role in the inner workings of foreign societies—transforming totalitarian states into democracies, impoverished nations into productive, healthy societies, etc. As one of the guests pointed out, this type of diplomacy requires different kind of diplomatic skill set.

(Rice gives her “transformational diplomacy” speech January 2006 at Georgetown University.)

In sum, the future of the FS looks grim if it can’t get the funding it needs to perform its vital role as America’s “first line of defense.” And if you believe what you read in The Economist, the future of American foreign policy as a whole looks even grimmer. This article published last month argues that a new US President, despite his or her campaign promises, will create little actual change in the conduct of US foreign policy.

Perhaps, as Kojo’s distinguished guests suggest, it isn’t so much the President that is the barrier to a fully-resourced FS, rather it is the Congress. But perhaps the Congress doesn’t have the will to fund the FS because the people the represent do not press for such expenditures. It seems like the American people must also call for a change if we are to ensure a brighter future for the US Foreign Service.

Former US Ambassador Chas Freeman addressed a conference of the University of Continuing Education Association last week.

Before retiring from the Foreign Service Freeman served at posts in nearly every continent and became a specialist in China. Notably, Freeman was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, from 1989-1992. In 1993–94, he served as Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defense. He currently serves as Chairman of the Board of Projects International, Inc., a Washington-based business development firm, and as President of the Middle East Policy Council.

Needless to say, the depth of Ambassador Freeman’s foreign policy experience makes him an excellent source for an analysis of the potential that diplomacy holds as a tool to leverage the critical threats the US faces today. As one would expect, his diplomatic experiences has also made him a natural advocate for employing diplomacy over military force in the international realm. His remarks (published on Middle East Online) on the potential of diplomacy to solve conflicts are powerful ones, and they are worth citing here.

Overall, Freeman wants to see a stronger, more cooperative United States. He believes the only path to achieving that goal is through the use of diplomacy.

Freeman begins by citing the massive expenditures the US spends on its military budget. He comments: “Somehow, however, despite all the money we’ve spent, the debt we’ve accumulated, and the sacrifices patriotic Americans have made in distant foreign lands, our leaders tell us that we have never been so threatened. Given all the enemies we have been making recently, they may be right… Massive military spending has, in fact, become an indispensable part of our political-economy…”

Freeman emphasized the importance of involving diplomats from the outset: “Most of our leaders, in both major political parties, now espouse a reversal of the longstanding American view that coercion, especially through military means, is a last resort to be brought into play only when diplomacy – in the form of persuasion, diplomatic bargaining, alliance-building, and other measures short of war – has failed. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the sequence approved on both sides of the aisle was to shoot first, then send in the diplomats to mop up. Since this hasn’t worked out too well, there is now a lot of talk about how to recruit more diplomats and buy more mops. That’s probably a good idea, but it might be more effective and cheaper to involve the diplomats at the outset and avoid creating such a mess in the first place.”

He continued: “Sadly, theories of coercion and plans to use military means to impose our will on other nations have for some time squeezed out serious consideration of diplomacy as an alternative to the use of force. Diplomacy is more than saying “nice doggie,” till you can find a rock. Weapons are tools to change men’s minds but they are far from the only means of doing so… The weapons of diplomats are words and their power is their persuasiveness. Talk is cheaper than firepower and does less collateral damage, so it makes sense to try it before blazing away at the adversary.”

On the supremely unequal funding of the country’s military and diplomatic services, Freeman commented: “You get what you pay for. In this case, that’s a superbly professional and supremely lethal military and an anemically staffed and undertrained diplomatic service led by inexperienced political appointees on sabbatical from high incomes… It is a truism that skilled work requires skilled workmen. Americans are now without peer in the military arts. To prevail against our current enemies, we must attain equal excellence in diplomacy.”

He concludes by offering some sage advice to his audience, the next President and the American people: “We cannot hope to appeal to the conscience of humankind if we do not continue to embody its aspirations. If we do not restore our country’s good name, others will not follow when we lead or share the burdens we take up. To regain the cooperation of allies and friends, we must rediscover how to listen, how to persuade, how to be a team player, and how to follow the rules we demand others follow… A return to diplomacy, not threats and the use of force, is the surest path to the reassertion of American leadership. It is time to rediscover and explore that path.”

Sage advice indeed.

Referring to the dissipating morale of the American cause, Thomas Paine wrote in the winter of 1776 that “these are the times that try men’s souls.” One might reflect today on Afghanistan as trying NATO’s soul. President Bush envisions a new mission for NATO through Afghanistan, while some see the fissure over troops in Afghanistan as a possible death knell for NATO.

This week President Bush embarks on his final NATO Summit, where he will attempt to persuade NATO allies to redouble their efforts in Afghanistan. His trip will include stops in Ukraine, Moscow, Croatia, and the summit in Bucharest.

The Bucharest summit will raise many issues other than Afghanistan, including the controversial missile defense proposal in Poland (and the alternative proposal in Czech Republic), Kosovo’s independence, and whether Georgia and Ukraine should be extended membership into NATO. All of these issues spark contrasts with Russia, which detests the old Soviet states enhancing their standing with the United States. As a diplomatic gesture, Putin and his successor Dmitry Medvedev were offered invitations to the summit.

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke with the Financial Times about the upcoming summit, and portrayed denial of Georgia into NATO as effectively providing Russia with a veto. He also suggested that Georgia could send their troops currently serving in Iraq to Afghanistan, in order to help relieve the troop strain on NATO.

France plans to announce the arrival of an additional 1,000 troops to Afghanistan. Coinciding with President Bush’s request for more troops, France will ask NATO members to “devote more resources to rebuilding Afghan society, bringing in judges, teachers, medical workers and civil administrators.”

France’s boost will help ease fears from Canada’s PM Steve Harper, who threatened to remove troops if other allies did not step-up. Additionally, the United States has slated 3,000 Marines for duty in Afghanistan. The strengthening alliance between France and the United States is just a small caveat amid a stronger notion of NATO members splitting over the troop issue in Afghanistan.

Richard Holbrooke writes today that “the conflict in Afghanistan will be far more costly and much, much longer than Americans realize. This war, already in its seventh year, will eventually become the longest in American history, surpassing even Vietnam.”

Any troop promises by NATO members other than France will signify a successful trip for President Bush. However, anything less (a likely prospect) will further the crisis.

The political winds have shifted in Pakistan, which leaves the question: How will the dynamics of Pakistan’s new political leaders play out with US policy goals in the region?

This Economist article provides some good context to recent and coming events in Pakistan. The article points out that that Administration’s key ally, Musharraf, faces a serious threat from Supreme Court justices possibly being reinstituted. He could be further weakened by a potential impeachment proceeding. This leaves little room for Musharraf to maneuver. In fact, his only available option to exert his influence is to declare emergency rule. “Mr. Musharraf could try to buy time by re-imposing a state of emergency. However, the army has made clear that it will not intervene unless serious instability looms.”

In another sign of abandonment, General Kayani relieved two of Mushraff’s top general this week. Without the army on board, Musharaff is in trouble. This sets the stage for recently elected Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani. The Economist article suggests Pakistan’s political crisis is not yet resolved and that in-fighting between the coalition’s two major parties, the PPP and PML (N) is likely. With Musharraf’s power waning, the United States must cultivate relationships with PM Gilani and coalition leaders, even through possible in-fighting.

Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte is doing just that today during a meeting with PM Gilani.

“The prime minister made it clear that the new government would continue to fight terrorism in all its forms by using democratic, economic and strategic means. ‘It is also a matter of concern for us and we will confront it with complete determination.’

Mr Gilani said Pakistan accorded high priority to its strategic relationship with the US and desired to expand the relations in all fields. He said US President George W. Bush had called him and pledged full support to Pakistan in us spheres. The prime minister said economic empowerment of people living along the Afghan border was key to addressing the issue of extremism in the region.

He expressed confidence that the establishment of ‘reconstruction opportunity zones’ would help increase economic activities in the area and create new opportunities for improving the standard of life of the people.”

When Henry Crumpton speaks, the US Diplomacy blog listens. Henry, also know as “Hank” during his time at the CIA, played a pivotal role in overthrowing the Taliban months after Sept 11^th. He is currently the Ambassador-at-Large for counterterrorism at the State Department. Crumpton understands the intricacies of the tribal nature in Afghanistan. He recognizes that our structures are not built for the local fight. Additionally, he is a superb strategic thinker and demonstrates this from a recent talk he gave at CSIS. For some weekend viewing, enjoy.

This week, Defense Secretary Gates and Secretary of State Rice combined efforts on improving the dampening European support for NATO troops in Afghanistan. Gates warned the Senate Armed Services Committee, “I worry a great deal about the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security, and others who are not.” He continued, “it puts a cloud over the future of the alliance if this is to endure and perhaps get even worse.” Following his testimony, Gates traveled to Lithuania, where he’s presently meeting with NATO defense ministers, looking to pressure European allies on the troop support issue.

Perhaps the impetus for the worrisome tone was Germany’s rejection of a U.S. request for more troops. Compounding the problem, Canada issued an ultimatum that it would withdraw troops if they did not receive reinforcement from NATO allies.

While ally support is fading from Germany, France is looked at to pick up the slack. “A reversal of France’s refusal to deploy combat units to the southern front-lines would ease tensions within NATO…France is to meet a Canadian delegation Friday [today] on Ottawa’s appeal for 1,000 extra troops to support its beleaguered force in volatile Kandahar province.”

Secretary Rice made a surprise visit to Afghanistan yesterday. While Gates is meeting with defense ministers in Lithuania, Rice also publicly urged NATO members to increase troop support. Additionally, she met with President Karzai to discuss a special envoy who could represent the numerous countries involved in the effort. “There are a lot of cooks in the kitchen. I can understand why there could be confusion, and we owe it to President Karzai to have an effective international coordinator.”

Analysis on this subject can be tricky. Are alliances with our European friends fracturing for the long-term, or are they simply growing weary of the Afghanistan counterinsurgency? Certainly, we must be mindful of the political context in each country. It may be helpful to remind NATO members that the stabilization of Afghanistan is imperative for each country and cite specific reasons. Maintaining an alliance can be a juggling act. However, the United States should not feel daunted, reminding allies about the nature of the threat and persuading them to stay in the fight is a necessary process in a multilateral war. We should be grateful we have the opportunity to fall back on other resources, unlike in Iraq.

On Wednesday of last week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard the testimony of three of President Bush’s nominees seeking confirmation to hold State Department positions in the bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.  The first to testify was James K. Glassman, whose nomination for Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy was previously discussed in this blog here. A transcript of his prepared testimony can be found here. 

It appears that Glassman has been doing his homework. Toward the end of his testimony he summarizes what he took away from some discussions he had with experts in on global public opinion of the U.S.:  

“1. Animosity toward the United States is real, and it must concern us. 

2. Different countries have different views of the United States. In Africa, Japan, and India, for example, most people favorably disposed toward the United States. In much of Western Europe and nearly all the Arab and Muslim world, they are not.  3. Much of the animosity is not deep. Even people who say they dislike us want to have strong bilateral relations with us, and attitudes are not set in stone. As Secretary Rice said last year, The United States is “still the place where people like to send their kids to school, where people want to start a new life. Sometimes we overstate the degree to which America is not popular, even if sometimes our policies are not.” 

4. The animosity of foreigners has three sources:

a. They understand that we are a powerful nation and will ultimately set policies with our own interests in mind, but they believe we do not listen to them, do not act as a reliable partner, and do not respectfully take their views into account.

b. In the Arab and Muslim world, especially, they have major misconceptions about America, our aims, and our policies. Remember the examples I cited before, such as a belief that we want to supplant Islam with Christianity in the Middle East. c. They disagree with our policies, especially our presence in Iraq and what they see as our bias in the matter of Israel and the Palestinians.

The first two sources of animosity, I believe, we can address effectively through public diplomacy. We can listen better and more respectfully and through exchanges, information programs, and ideological engagement, we can address and rectify the lies and misconceptions. 

As for policy: Edward R. Murrow, when he was USIA director, famously said that public diplomacy should be in on the takeoffs, not just the crash landings. In other words, public diplomacy should have a place at the table, to advise policymakers of the potential reaction of foreign publics to policies. But never, in my view, should global public opinion polls determine the foreign policy of the United States. Can we do a better job explaining our policies? Yes. Will those policies be universally embraced? No. In the early 1980s, the U.S. and our allies agreed on the placement of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. It was a decision that was aggressively opposed by much of Europe’s public opinion, but it was a policy that helped bring down communism…” 

News reports on his testimony focused on Glassman’s purported plan to counter Islamic extremism’s detrimental effects on the US image abroad with digital media. From the Voice of America:  “Glassman, who has a background in print and electronic media, says he will use the year or so before the end of the Bush administration to focus on leading a war of ideas using new technologies…”  

Glassman says the perception that the US is trying to undermine Islam, which he cites as widespread in the Muslim world, “come[s] directly from what he calls doctrine at the foundation of al-Qaida, and must be fought using the Internet, U.S. government-funded international broadcasting, and educational and cultural exchange programs.”  CNN and others picked up on Glassman’s comment that “our enemies are eating our lunch in terms of getting their messages communicated using ‘digital technology.’” He continued: “It is just plain embarrassing that al Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America.” 

Diane Farsetta, Senior Researcher at the Center for Media and Democracy also discussed Glassman’s focus on digital technologies as a public diplomacy tool in a piece for Alternet. 

VOA reports that Glassman fielded some pointed questions from the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) asked Glassman to comment on criticism the bureau of Public Diplomacy has received for “having a weak communications strategy which obviously raises questions about its ability to meet its important mission.” Glassman responded that “U.S. efforts have suffered from a lack of coordination among government agencies. He pledged to help rebuild a public diplomacy structure [the US Information Agency, or USIA] he says was largely dismantled amid what he calls a bipartisan period of neglect in the 1990s.”  

Also testifying was Goli Ameri, President Bush’s nominee to hold the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). Ameri would replace Dina Habib Powell, who held the position from 2005 until December 2007, when she left the Department to become the Director of Global Corporate Engagement for the Goldman Sachs Group.

   Ameri (seated on the far right), formerly the Department’s Public Delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, spoke of her upbringing in Iran and the impact of her move to the U.S. study at Stanford University. In her testimony she called herself “an American by choice.” 

“[While studying in the US] I learned…the value of freedom and democracy, the fundamentals of critical thinking, the questioning of ideas and a profound sense of empowerment. I learned that in America, there are no constraints to one’s desire to achieve. That it’s ok to be a woman, it’s ok to be an immigrant and most importantly its ok to be a dreamer Where else in the world, would an immigrant, a woman of Iranian heritage be nominated as an Assistant Secretary and have the privilege to sit in front of this distinguished panel?”

In 2004, Ameri ran for Congress in Oregon on the Republican ticket, but lost to Congressman David Wu by a narrow margin.   If confirmed, Ameri pledged to “expand our ‘people to people exchanges’ [diplomatic speak for directly engaging citizens of two different countries in an attempt to build positive relations between the two nations and introduce: (1) More opportunities for engagement with key countries like Iran and North Korea where we seek to better relations between our citizens and (2) Reach out to the more disadvantaged segments of the population around the world. I will encourage more women and girls, to participate in our exchange programs and I would like to make sure that we institutionalize successful and powerful programs like the Middle East Breast Cancer Initiative and the Fortune Women’s Mentorship program.”   Ameri’s nomination caused a negative reaction from some Iran-watchers (see here and here ), but then again so did the nomination of the past Assistant Secretary for ECA, Dina Habib Powell, an Egyptian-American, prompting, among other reactions, this letter to the Washington Post by Arab-American institute President James Zogby. 

The hearing’s final testimony came from David J. Kramer, nominated to be Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DLR), the bureau that leads U.S. efforts to “promote democracy, protect human rights and international religious freedom, and advance labor rights globally.”  Kramer, currently Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, will be replacing Jonathan D. Farrar who held the position since 2005.  If confirmed, Kramer pledged to “continue to concentrate DRL’s diplomacy and programs on the core components of democracy that must be present in countries around the globe if human rights are to be effectively exercised and protected: (1) free and fair electoral processes, with a level playing field to ensure genuine competition; (2) good governance, with representative, transparent and accountable institutions operating under the rule of law, including independent legislatures and judiciaries; and (3) robust civil societies, including independent media and labor unions.”

A 2006 assessment of the State Department’s Public Diplomacy (PD) program conducted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB, a Cabinet-level office run out the White House) ranks the program’s overall performance “adequate,” (as opposed to “effective, moderately effective, or ineffective”). The more abbreviated “assessment summary” can be found here.

The State Department describes the key functions of Public Diplomacy and its foreign officers as “indispensable” to the conduct of foreign policy. Accordingly, PD’s key activities, as outlined in the assessment’s “program performance measures,” amount to no small feat for PD officers.

According to the assessment, the program’s main goal is generating an “audience with an improved or increased understanding of U.S. policies, society and values.” Some of the ‘softer’ goals listed in the assessment include reaching key foreign audiences through State Department-sponsored exchange programs and increasing the user satisfaction scores of the US Embassy Web sites.

The more public relations-type functions (to give a less cynical depiction) include generating “accurate/favorable portrayals” of U.S. policies in key foreign media outlets and engineering editorial and opinion commentary support by foreign audiences for U.S. policies and positions.

Then there’s the granddaddy of them all: reducing the level of anti-American sentiment among key foreign audiences. This goal is commonly referred to as “winning hearts and minds,” a campaign the US first launched during the Vietnam war, and now commonly refers to US efforts at improving relations with the “Muslim” world. Given the rise in anti-American sentiment across the Middle East and beyond, this particular performance measurement may drag down PD’s overall ranking for a good time to come.

With such far-reaching and invasive goals set out, it is no wonder PD’s lowest-scoring is the “Program Results” assessment section: “Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals? Answer: No” (the assessment sites as evidence polling from Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew’s 2007 polling on global views of the US is shown below).

Relative to other US government programs assessed by OMB, PD’s “adequate” ranking puts it on the lower end of the performance spectrum. The State Department as a whole performs about as well as other government agencies (27 “effective” programs, 12 “moderately effective,” 13 “adequate,” 0 “inadequate”), such as Defense, (19, 19, 10, 0), Homeland Security (9, 18, 6, 0). Based on OMB’s most recent assessments, 22% of Federal programs are “not performing,” or are considered ineffective. To view an explanation of the ranking criteria, click here.

Though the ExpectMore.gov site has been criticized for the “shallowness of its content,” the 2006 assessment does a good job of conveying exactly what State’s PD program attempts to achieve (or, as the case may be, not achieve).

Three cheers for transparency… But by tasking this relatively small bureau with challenging goals such as “changing the hearts and minds” of vast, increasingly antagonistic foreign audiences—especially without necessarily pairing that goal with the implementation of effective and agreeable foreign policies—we will continue to “ExpectMore” out of State’s PD program.

US President George W. Bush famously characterized a nation’s position on the war on terror either “with us or against us.” But happens when those who are “with us” are not necessarily “against” those who are “against us?” Such is the case in Pakistan, where with the help of some polling and John Stewart, we see that the Pakistan-US relationship is a bit more complex.

The US-Pakistan Relationship

Although the American and Pakistani governments have shared tight alliances in the past, the Bush administration and Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharraf have developed a particularly close relationship throughout the past 7 years. The relationship centers around Musharraf’s pledge to be “with us” in the war on terror, that is, to hunt down US arch enemy Osama bin Laden and other Islamic extremists reported to be operating out of Pakistan.

The US has recognized these efforts, formally so in 2002 when the House passed a concurrent resolution “Commending President Pervez Musharraf Of Pakistan For His Leadership And Friendship And Welcoming Him To The United States” (full text here). Musharraf’s counter-terrorism efforts have been amply funded by the US, having received more than $10 billion in mostly military aid since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

While the General’s efforts were initially praised, more recently his commitment to fighting terrorism has been questioned, especially his effectiveness in combating a resurgence of Al Qaeda and Taliban extremists along the Pakistan-Afghan border. In January of last year the House passed (see section 2042) an appropriations bill that called for greater accountability for aid to Pakistan, though it failed to pass the Senate.

Meanwhile, Musharraf instists that he is committed to fighting terrorism within Pakistan not for the sake of the US-Pakistan alliance, but rather for the sake of his own nation’s national security.

He’s so committed to rooting out Islamic extremists, the AP reported two days ago, that he has made that his number one priority—not so much finding bin Laden, as the US wishes.

Enter Public Opinion

Whether or not you believe General Musharraf is sincere in his efforts to hunt down bin Laden, a recent poll shows the Pakistani public doesn’t seem all too concerned about the hunt for bin Laden, and anyway thinks the US poses a bigger threat to Pakistan’s national security.

Veteran Inter Press Service Washington correspondent Jim Lobe reports:“Amid reports that the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush is considering aggressive covert actions against armed Islamist forces in western Pakistan, a new survey released here Monday suggested that such an effort would be opposed by an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis themselves.

The survey, which was funded by the quasi-governmental U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and designed by the University of Maryland’s Programme on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), also found that a strong majority of Pakistanis consider the U.S. military presence in Asia and neighbouring Afghanistan a much more critical threat to their country than al Qaeda or Pakistan’s own Taliban movement in the tribal regions along the border with Afghanistan.”

The poll also shows that most urban Pakistanis do not necessarily believe Bin Laden is currently operating in Pakistan, and even so they have mixed views of the Al Qaeda leader:

“Q25. For each of the following people, would you say your feelings are very positive, somewhat positive, mixed, somewhat negative, or very negative? a. Osama bin Laden

Very positive………………………………………………………………………13%

Somewhat positive……………………………………………………………….18 Mixed…………………………………………………………………………………19

Somewhat negative………………………………………………………………..8

Very negative………………………………………………………………………..8

Refused/Don’t know…………………………………………………………….35”

In short, the Pakistani public has what their government considers “ally” and “enemy” reversed.

Enter John Stewart

Pop culture provides us a further example of how the “with us or against us” approach to the war on terror does not accurately fit the complexities of the modern US-Pakistan relationship. In September of 2006 General Musharraf appeared on Jon Stewart’s popular satirical news show in the United States—in fact the first foreign President ever to do so. Stewart popped the question of whether President George W. Bush or Osama bin Laden would win the popular vote in a presidential election in Pakistan. Musharraf chuckled “I think they’ll both lose miserably.”

At least we know that Al Qaeda doesn’t see Musharraf as “with them” in their war against the US.

Progress

Despite the US President’s unfailing support for Musharraf as an ally in the war on terror, US lawmakers are becoming more critical, no doubt thanks to several compelling testimonies (notably Lawrence Korb and Ashley Tellis) before Congressional committees of late.

“It has become all too clear that U.S. policies and assistance toward Pakistan since Sept. 11 — while not without some successes — have failed to neutralize anti-Western militants or reduce religious extremism,” said Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who chaired a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on aid to Pakistan this month.

Last week the Agence France Presse reported that Representative Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, “said that the reliance by President George W. Bush’s administration on “war on terror” ally Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to restore democracy while fighting against extremism had not worked.“

The IHT reports that in a recent hearing Ackerman urged [US Deputy Secretary of State] Negroponte to “get some phone numbers of some other generals.”

Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the few to identify the public as one layer of Pakistani society that the US should be seeking to ally: “The United States must shift from the “transactional” approach of “aid for services to a normal, functioning relationship… The United States should seek a “relationship based on the Pakistani government and its people, not just Musharraf,” Biden said.

Who’s “With” Who?

Now Bush’s mantra has come full circle: US lawmakers are beginning to turn “against” those who are supposed to be “with us” in the war on terror. This evolution in the US-Pakistan relationship over the past seven years shows that neither the US nor Pakistan—their leaders nor their publics—fit squarely into the “with us or against us” approach to the war on terror.