U.S. Diplomacy

This post collects sage advice for US policy toward the Middle East: one aspect of US foreign policy that could really use a jump-start.

First, a new analysis by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Scholars Marina Ottoway and Mohammed Herzallah assess the diplomatic efforts of Arab regimes seeking to fill the power vacuum left by the absence of a strong regime in Iraq and ineffectual U.S. policy.

According to the policy brief, titled “The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.,” Arab countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives that clearly contradict U.S. policy, because they no longer trust the U.S. capacity to contend with escalating regional crises. The authors argue that even Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead on policies toward Iran, Lebanon, or Hamas.

Here are some of the authors’ conclusions:

•While new Arab diplomatic initiatives may contradict current U.S. policy, they may not contravene long-term U.S. interests.

• Arab regional diplomacy lacks an overarching vision and is instead based on a desire to reduce imminent threats.

• Influence in the Arab world has shifted to the Gulf and the change is likely permanent due to increased oil wealth and the crises engulfing other regions.

• The United States and Saudi Arabia, historically close allies, often hope for the same outcome in regional conflicts but pursue different strategies. In trying to contain Iran, Saudi Arabia seeks to avoid confrontation through diplomatic engagement, while the United States favors isolation. Saudi Arabia promotes reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas as a necessary step in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, while the United States refuses to recognize Hamas.

In the end, the authors state that: ”whether the policies of these (Arab) countries will diverge from those of the United States depends as much on U.S. choices as on theirs.”

Second, from the Arab world, an opinion piece  by Rami Khouri, editor-at-large of The Daily Star (Lebanon), offers advice for US policy in the Middle East. He devised a list of ten principles and policies that he believes should define American policies in the Middle East. Here’s a sampling:

1. Politically engage all legitimate actors: The American tendency to boycott or try and destroy major players in the region, like Hizbullah and Hamas, is childish and counter-productive. All those whom the United States has held at arm’s length have tended to become stronger in the region — partly by garnering public support for defying and resisting the United States….

2. Seek peace, security and prosperity for all according to a single standard: Foreign powers in the Middle East must give Arabs, Israelis, Iranians and Turks fully equal weight in terms of their rights and interests, rather than giving some countries priority or even exclusivity in areas like security, nuclear technology, etc.

3. Use multilateral engagement mechanisms more than unilateral military means or threats: The UN and its agencies offer useful, legitimate and effective mechanisms to address contentious issues if they are used regularly, and not whimsically or opportunistically.

4. Be consistent on core issues across the region: Double-standards in enforcing UN resolutions or international conventions, or promoting freedom and democracy, badly erode American credibility, respect and efficacy, severely curtailing US impact and influence over time…”

Finally, an expert on Middle East affairs offers some more general pointers studying the region. Fred Halliday, after teaching Middle Eastern affairs at the London School of Economics for more than 20 years, retired from teaching in March. The latest issue of the LSE alumni magazine includes an essay Halliday authored titled “Shaping the Middle East,” based on a farewell lecture he gave at the university.

In the essay, Halliday offers 5 pointers on how a Westerner should approach studying the Middle East. First, he says one must understand the history of the region: “We need to see the region not in its millennial abstraction and mystifi cation, but as, like Europe, Latin America and East Asia, a product of modern international economic, political and social forces.”

Second, Halliday emphasizes that, as in the study of other regions, the starting point for the study of the Middle East should be the nation-state.

The state, Halliday says, consists of “the institutions of coercion, administration and territorial delimitation: it is states that shape identities, religions, economies. There is no such thing as the Middle Eastern state, the oriental state, the Arab state, the Islamic state: there are entities which rule, coerce, tax, spend, mobilise, in the modern regional and international context in which they find themselves.

 And, equally importantly, it is the desire to control the state, or else to set up their own separate state, as today with the Kurds, Palestinians and Southern Sudanese, and earlier with the Zionist movement in Palestine, that explains the politics of opposition groups, be they democratic, authoritarian or insurrectionary.”

Third is culture: “In the Middle East as elsewhere, issues of culture and religion do matter in explaining political attitudes and behaviour. But culture broadly defined, including religion, does not in itself explain modern politics, social behaviour or international relations… Far too much of the study of the contemporary Middle East takes culture as a given, and as, in social science terms, an independent and explanatory variable, instead of seeing it as itself shaped by modern, domestic and international forces…”

Fourth is the oft-forgotten factor of economics: “If one wants to understand why and how external powers have dominated, partitioned, controlled and intervened in the Middle East, then economic factors remain central to the story, not only in regard to oil and gas extraction, which form the largest industries and the most traded commodities in the world, but also in regard to markets, and, of enormous if often only partly visible importance, to the recycling and reinvestment of oil revenues.”Finally it is imperative to grasp the role that different political actors play in the region. Here Halliday specifically warns against assuming that the region always acts as an integrated whole. He says:

“Even as regional forces are at play, be it in regard to nuclear weapons, migration flows or terrorism, the 25 countries of the region remain distinct and in some ways separated from each other, a system of interacting units but not a homogenous whole.This means that with specific conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, or the Iran-Iraq war, or now the multi-layered war in Iraq, we should be careful how far we see these conflicts as dominating, or defining, the region as a whole.”

Sage advice on a region of supreme importance for US foreign policy.

New York Times veteran columnist Nicholas Kristof weighed in this weekend on what he calls a “cancer in American foreign policy.” He lists the symptoms:

“1) The United States has more musicians in its military bands than it has diplomats.

2) This year alone, the United States Army will add about 7,000 soldiers to its total; that’s more people than in the entire American Foreign Service.

3) More than 1,000 American diplomatic positions are vacant because the Foreign Service is so short-staffed, but a myopic Congress is refusing to finance even modest new hiring. Some 1,100 could be hired for the cost of a single C-17 military cargo plane.

In short, the United States is hugely overinvesting in military tools and underinvesting in diplomatic tools. The result is a lopsided foreign policy that antagonizes the rest of the world and is ineffective in tackling many modern problems.”

On the US counterterrorism strategy Kristof argues: “Our intuitive approach to fighting terrorists and insurgents is to blow things up. But one of the most cost-effective counterterrorism methods in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan may be to build things up, like schooling and microfinance. Girls’ education sometimes gets more bang for the buck than a missile.”

He cites a recent RAND Corporation report studying the dissolution of terrorist organizations. “There is no battlefield solution to terrorism. Military force usually has the opposite effect from what is intended.””

If Kristof’s argument up to here sounds totally obvious and necessary to you, consider another viewpoint. Brian Darling, director of Senate Relations for the conservative Heritage Foundation, had this critique of Senator Barack Obama’s foreign policy platform:

“He clearly leans toward the diplomacy side in world affairs. Foreign aid, agriculture aid, using federal tax dollars to buy a country’s affections is one element of diplomacy. But I hope he realizes that having a strong military is another form of diplomacy.”

I am not quire sure what Darling means by this–a strong military as a form of diplomacy. Here’s one image that comes to mind: this strong military invites a group of foreign dignitaries to the State Department for a diplomatic reception. At the bottom of the invitation, instead of saying “Respondez s’il Vous Plait,” it says, “Be there, or else we’ll kick your butt to smithereens!!”

Or maybe, if a strong military were a form of diplomacy, instead of building bombs and warheads, it could invest billions of dollars to develop a device that would automatically produce the optimal outcome for all parties involved in a given international negotiation . It could be called the “Stealth Consensus Builder 2000″ (I hereby call patent rights!).

In practice, our strong military and our diplomatic corps collaborate frequently and successfully. But I think Kristof–and many others–would agree that they are hardly interchangeable. Kristof’s point is exactly the opposite: too often our strong military has been deployed in place of diplomatic efforts.

What does Kristof suggest as a first step toward recovery? “Let’s agree that diplomats should be every bit as much of an American priority as musicians in military bands.” It’s no Stealth Consensus Builder, but I’ll take it.

It’s not too late to dig into some summer reading. If you have a hankering to read something intellectually dense, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) can help. At the request of the Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs, has put together a “Foreign Affairs Professional Reading List.“

The list aims “to serve as a resource for Foreign Service and Civil Service employees of the foreign affairs agencies,” but the list is befitting of all of us foreign policy buffs.

Since summer is quickly drawing to a close, I’d recommend perusing their “Highly Recommended” list. The New York Times blog about books called “Paper Cuts” had

“The shorter list lends itself to a few observations. The first is that it’s comforting to see the department has its priorities straight. The emphasis in books like Dennis Ross’s “Statecraft” and Joseph Nye’s “Soft Power” is on diplomacy and on what talking and compromise can accomplish in a dangerous world, exactly the perspective we expect the State Department to demonstrate and advocate. Those primarily interested in military solutions to international crises have a different department they can consult for reading recommendations.

Second, and more surprising, the State Department seems willing to entertain the notion that the United States is in fact an empire, with an empire’s problems, a point not often made in official Washington, at least not publicly. So department employees are advised to read Niall Ferguson’s “Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire,” Robert Kagan’s “Dangerous Nation” and Paul Kennedy’s “Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.”

And third, in the long-standing intellectual division between the Realists, who argue that foreign policy should be based on national interest, and Wilsonian moralists, who stress ethical principles as a guide to international relations, the department’s list is weighted strongly on the side of the Realists, with books by Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Richard Haass and John Lewis Gaddis. The most influential Wilsonians of our time — the neoconservatives — are represented only by Kagan (and his book is more about American expansion than American values). There is no Victor Davis Hanson here, no Mark Steyn, no Norman Podhoretz.

All of which is to say that if the White House or the Vice President’s office were to compile a list of recommended reading for their employees, it would look very different indeed.”

I am guessing the compilation of the list had to be a bi-partisan effort, no? Happy reading!

The American Academy of Diplomacy, in partnership with the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) held a panel discussion back in April at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs in Minneapolis to discuss “diplomatic engagement with non-governmental organizations and civil society to promote effective democratic governance.”

The event’s featured speakers were: Ambassador Edwin Corr, former ambassador to Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, former ambassador to Yemen, Ken Wollack, president of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Lorne Craner, president of the International Republican Institute (IRI).

You can watch the entire session here. If you don’t have tons of time, I highly recommend listening to Ambassador Bodine’s remarks about he rexperiences promoting democracy in Yemen.

Bodine spoke about how democratization and stabilization from conflict are not mutually exclusive activities, rather the need to be addressed at the same time. She spoke about her efforts to work with NGOs within Yemen to help them help the country on the path of democratization.

Bodine said: “[one must] Find out where the society wants to go, what are their priorities and then figure out how you [being the US government] support them to move forward.” She said that for this to work, these efforts can’t be focused solely on national security concerns within that country.

Ambassador Corr’s remarks about his experience promoting democracy in El Salvador is also interesting. He related some lessons learned, such as: emphasise civilian rule over military rule, make sure the Salvadorians are in charge of the democratization process, and that it is their style of democracy being implemented, etc.

He said the approach has to be holistic, that is engage our whole government with their whole government, our judges with their judges, but always in a supportive, not dominating role. He also emphasized that embassy staff equipped with language skills is essential. He also said that you can’t start to promote democracy if the country isn’t ready for it yet.

Joe Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held a hearing last week on an important topic in American foreign policy.  In Biden’s words the hearing was called to explore the following question:

“In expanding the role of our armed forces, have we diminished our civilian capabilities - our diplomatic and development assistance institutions—and have we done so in a way that undermines our national security?”

The hearing sought to voice some of the most experienced witnesses of this phenomenon: the Deputy Secretary of State, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, a former committee staffer, and a gaggle of experienced voices from the NGO/think tank sector.

In his opening remarks Biden laid out the reasoning behind the hearing:

“There has been a migration of functions and authorities from U.S. civilian agencies to the Department of Defense. Between 2002 and 2005, the share of U.S. official development assistance channeled through the Pentagon budget surged from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005, rising to $5.5 billion. Much of this increase has gone towards activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it still points to an expanding military role in what were traditionally civilian programs.

I share the concern that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently raised. `The military,’ he said, `has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations…This has led to concern…about what’s seen as a creeping `militarization’…of America’s foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment.”

Biden said the expanding role of the military on US foreign policy is problematic for several reasons: “First, the increasing dominance of the military in our foreign policy may inadvertently limit our options – when the military is the most readily available option, it is more likely to be used, whether or not it is the best choice…

…Finally, militaries are good at winning wars and training armies. But, in my view, we do not want soldiers training lawyers or setting up court systems. Or instructing health-care workers on HIV/AIDS prevention? Or running a micro-finance program? Out of necessity, our men and women in uniform have gotten very good at this. But it is not their primary mission; war-fighting is.”

Biden laid out a series of questions related to this phenomenon that the hearing sought to explore. He then turned it over to Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte (also a former Ambassador to Iraq). Negroponte spoke primarily to Biden’s question on the status of interagency coordination. “By law,” Biden said, “the State Department plays the primary role in overseeing foreign assistance activities. In practice, the Department of Defense is taking on more and more responsibility for traditionally foreign assistance programs. How can we ensure that State plays its proper and necessary role?”

In his testimony, Negroponte echoed both Biden’s and Gates’ assessments of the problem: “The mission to stabilize and reconstruct a nation is one that civilians must lead. But for too long, we have not had sufficient numbers of trained, prepared, and supported civilians who could provide that leadership. As a result, over the past 20 years, over the course of 17 significant stabilization and reconstruction missions in which the United States has been involved, too much of the effort has been borne by our men and women in uniform.”

But Negroponte defended the Defense Department, saying it has taken the appropriate amount of control in foreign assistance operations:

“As we work to increase civilian capacity to perform the diplomatic and development missions demanded by our national security strategy, we are grateful and better off for the Defense Department’s contribution of expertise, personnel, and resources in support of our work.

Our nation is safer and stronger when our lead national security agencies are united in purpose. DoD’s contribution is not only meeting military requirements, but directly advancing the goal of our diplomacy: a world of democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and act responsibly in the international system.”

The Committee also sought the insight of a former colleague–Mary Locke, a retired Senior Professional Staff member for the Committee. Locke discussed an oversight report that she and her colleagues on the committee drafted in 2006 at the request of the Committee’s Ranking Member, Senator Lugar. The report was based on the drafters’ travels to US embassies throughout Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East with the aim of examining the relationship between the State Department and the Defense Department.

Although the report is widely acknowledged within government, Locke read the report’s key conclusions for those at the hearing:

1) The number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in non-combat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated. The leadership qualities of the ambassador are a determinative factor in striking a prudent U.S. military posture in our embassies.

2) While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists and their support networks is an imperative in the campaign against terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat in the long-term.  It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance.

As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.”

On the budget disparity between Defense and State, Locke pointed out that blame shouldn’t be placed entirely, as some claim, on the Bush Adminstration’s narrow focus on the “war on terror”:

“[In a past report issued in November] we found that during the Bush administration’s tenure up until that time, the Congress had denied some $7.6 billion that the President requested in his regular foreign aid budget. With this track record on the foreign affairs 150 budget account, it should not be a shockingly unexpected development when the executive branch turns to the defense 050 account as an alternative, a budget that is larger by a factor of at least twelve.”

In other words, when Congress denies President’s request for foreign assistance funds placed in the “150 budget account” (which funds the breadth of the State Department’s activities) the President then logically tries to channels funding for that purpose through the more ample Defense Department budget. Hence, Congress’s appropriations have in part promoted the shift of foreign assistance responsibilities towards the better-funded Defense Department.

There is such rich testimony in this hearing I couldn’t possibly cover it all here. I’ll leave you with Mary Locke’s final point, as it relates closely with the subject of this blog:

“This Committee should carry out vigorous oversight on the issue of the role of the military in foreign policy. It is as important to listen to our ambassadors to get a handle on this issue as to officials in headquarters. Studies, hearings such as this, and appropriate legislative and budget decisions will go a long way toward keeping the right balance struck.”

 Looks like Defence Secretary Gates’ call for more support for US “soft power” tools is a view also shared by those under his command.  A new poll of US military officers conducted by the US Global Leadership Campaign shows that they overwhelmingly support diplomatic tools to addressing the variety of security challenges the US faces. A majority of the officers also said that the US is doing too little to strengthen its use of non-military tools.

In a nudge to the State Department’s Bureau of Public Diplomacy, a large majority of the officers agreed (77%) that the degree to which America is respected by people overseas makes a difference to the effectiveness of our military overseas. Furthermore, a 62% majority of officers surveyed rate “restoring respect for America around the world by playing a positive leadership role in addressing major global challenges” as a very important goal.

From the poll’s summary of findings:

𐂃 Today’s military officers believe we face very different security challenges than we did during the Cold War and must use different tools and strategies to address those challenges.

𐂃 A significant majority of officers surveyed embrace a new paradigm in which strengthened diplomacy and development assistance are important companions to traditional military tools for achieving America’s national security goals. 𐂃 A majority of officers serving in the post-9/11 era have seen the benefit of non-military tools such as development assistance and diplomacy firsthand, particularly those deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.

𐂃 These poll results suggest the next Commander in Chief must understand that a strong military alone is not enough to protect America and that military officers believe we must also improve diplomatic relations and do more to promote stability in the world by improving health, education, and economic opportunity in other countries.”

This support for the use of soft power comes from an unlikely, but extremely important source. The military knows that it cannot confront the national security threats of the 21st century without diplomacy in its arsenal.

Just released from Agence France Presse:

“Defense Secretary Robert Gates called for greater funding for U.S. diplomacy and foreign development aid July 15, acknowledging concerns about a “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy.

“Broadly speaking, when it comes to America’s engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is - and is clearly seen to be - in a supporting role to civilian agencies,” he said. “Our diplomatic leaders, be they in ambassadors’ suites or on the State Department’s seventh floor, must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy.”

Gates’ speech was delivered as the keynote address of an event that the US Global Leadership Campaign held yesterday in Washington.

(Bush and Singh at the G-8 Meeting this week in Tokyo) 

The biggest headline emanating from this week’s G-8 summit in Tokyo had nothing to do with poverty alleviation, or climate change. Rather it had to do with negotiations between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh about a nuclear deal three years in the making.

Referred to as the 123 Agreement, the deal would allow the US to sell atomic fuel and technology to India provided that India open its civilian reactors to international inspections by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).

Proponents of this deal say it is a great business opportunity for the US, and would supply India with the equipment it needs to build more nuclear power stations. President Bush has also argued that the deal would have more intangible effect of empowering a friendly democracy (which borders US rival China) that has demonstrated what he sees as nuclear responsibility.

Opponents say: “It rewards India with civil nuclear help even though Delhi, which has refused to sign the (Nuclear Non-Proliferation) treaty, acquired nuclear weapons. In doing so, it weakens the treaty’s central bargain: that the original five nuclear powers (the US, UK, France, China and Russia) would help non-nuclear weapons states with civil power provided their ambitions stopped there.”

Critics are skeptical that India’s nuclear ambitions, will, in fact stop there–especially since India has already acquired nuclear weapons. Some critics even say that the deal could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia, or at the very least weaken campaigns to halt other nations’ (on the axis of evil, who shall remain nameless) nuclear enrichment programs. 

After Bush and Singh’s discussions at the G-8 summit, Prime Minister Singh announced that it will hold up his end of the bargain and comply with IAEA inspections, thereby declaring India’s intention to move forward with the deal.

The US Ambassador to India, David Mulford, saidin a reactionary statement: ”The US welcomes the government of India’s initiative to move forward with the US-India civil nuclear deal by seeking the IAEA approval for its safeguards agreement,” and said the US government will work closely with New Delhi, the IAEA, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and the US Congress to implement it “as quickly as possible.”

But there have been two major factors working against the deal and particularly come to a head now that signing the deal into law is in sight. First, domestic opposition within India may shut down not only the deal, but kick PM Siingh out of office altogether.  This week the left-wing parties in the Indian parliament quit the Prime Minister’s coalition over fears that the deal would ”give Washington too much influence over Indian foreign policy.” Hereis the text of the left parties’ grievances in regards to the deal. It states:

“The UPA Government came into existence in 2004 with the support of the Left parties on the basis of its Common Minimum Programme. The aim was to fight the communal forces and undo the damage they had done to the secular polity of India in their years in office. This required a set of interlinked policies to bring relief to the people, to protect India’s integrity and to pursue an independent foreign policy. By going ahead with the deal at a time when there is the crushing burden of price-rise and galloping inflation, the Manmohan Singh Government has clearly shown that it is more concerned about fulfilling its commitment to the Bush administration rather than meeting its commitment to the people of India.”

Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (and a Senior Advisor to the State Department on, among other things, the India-US nuclear deal) talked to NPR last week about how Indian concerns for maintaining independence, or rather its sovereignty, from other nations has created a stiff opposition to the deal within India. He gives some other interesting insights into the deal as well.

Yesterday the Prime Minister set the date of a vote of confidence in the Parliament, which, if lost, could force his government into early elections after four years in power, and scuttle the nuclear deal entirely.

The second, considerably formidable obstacle to sealing the India-UN nuclear deal is time and the US Congress (not a good mix). The BBC reports that the IAEA and the NSG may not bless the deal with enough time for Congress to pass the legislation required to make the deal US law before Congress closes the 2008 session in November. 

After that point, it’s hard to tell whether the incoming Presidential administration will share President Bush’s support for the nuclear pact. The AP reports, for example, “Christine Fair, a South Asia specialist at the RAND Corp., said that “the underbelly of this deal, as Bush envisioned it, was that, with our help, India was going to become a global power, and that meant becoming a global nuclear power. I just don’t know if McCain or Obama are going to embrace that.”

So far Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama has come out in supportof it. McCain’s position is unknown to me. Either way, according to Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution argues that either candidate, once President, may throw in some extra challenges to the Indian side of the deal.

It will be a race to confidence if this deal is to go through. I, personally, will root for sovereignty and time to come out on top.

Former Secretaries of State James A. Baker III (1989 to 1992) and Warren Christopher (1993 to 1997), wearing their hats as the co-chairmen of the National War Powers Commission, authored an op-ed in the New York Times yesterday, arguing on behalf of the findings of their commission’s recent report.

They write:

“The most agonizing decision we make as a nation is whether to go to war. Our Constitution ambiguously divides war powers between the president (who is the commander in chief) and Congress (which has the power of the purse and the power to declare war). The founders hoped that the executive and legislative branches would work together, but in practice the two branches don’t always consult. And even when they do, they often dispute their respective powers.

A bipartisan group that we led, the National War Powers Commission, has unanimously concluded after a year of study that the law purporting to govern the decision to engage in war — the 1973 War Powers Resolution — should be replaced by a new law that would, except for emergencies, require the president and Congressional leaders to discuss the matter before going to war. Seventy years of polls show that most Americans expect Congress and the president to talk before making that decision, and in most cases, they have done so.”

After discussing the pluses of their proposed statute, they conclude: “When it comes to war, Americans deserve better than a law that is ineffective and ignored. They deserve a law that will encourage future presidents and Congresses to work together to protect our nation.”

Another former Secretary of State,  Colin Powell  spoke to a group of young people at the Center for International and Strategic Studies this week. He was the keynote speaker at the kickoff event of a new CSIS initiative called “Next America” aimed at getting young people engaged in international affairs in advance of the Presidential election and beyond. You can watch the entire event by clicking here.

His remarks touched on a variety of issues related to US foreign policy. In regards to the US role in international affairs, Powell said “The only three nations capable of confronting the US militarily are Russia, India and China, and all three want to have good relations with the US.”

The ongoing theme of his talk was wealth creation, and how it is going to be the driving force of the world for better or worse. He emphasized that it needs to be is used wisely in order to make the world a peaceful place.

In a lighter moment, in an attempt to reach out to his youthful audience, Powell admitted to “Google”-ing himself, to demonstrate that he too is part of the “digital” area.

Note to General Powell: since you will probably come across this post at some point in your searching, I apologize for calling out your self-Googling habit. Not to worry, we all have Googled ourselves at one time or another. The fact that you do too gives the rest of us a way to identify with you on a broader level. And it illustrated the point in your talk about the digital revolution well.

Former Ambassador Chas Freeman addressed the World Affairs Council in Washington, DC last week. The title of his talk: “America In the World: Magoo at the Helm.” His remarks provide a sobering, yet extremely important account of the changes afloat in the international realm.

I’ll let the Ambassador speak for himself.

“A great many governments abroad now fear that Washington will behave like the ever-self-congratulatory Mr. Magoo – wandering destructively through a reality he misperceives and wreaking havoc he determinedly misinterprets as success. Few believe that our country can still combine realism with statesmanship. More tellingly, a lot have concluded that, far from involving the United States, dispensing with a role for Washington is the only way to solve problems.”

The Ambassador related US foreign policy to the Middle East, his region of expertise, as an example of this recent phenomenon. He goes on to say:

“This is not just because Mr. Magoo has seemingly succeeded Uncle Sam at the helm. In some measure, it’s because the United States has taken sides in disputes with respect to which we had traditionally maintained at least a pretense of evenhandedness. We are therefore seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It is because promiscuous efforts by the United States to impose military solutions on problems that force cannot resolve have left no room for American diplomacy.

The resulting default on reality-based problem-solving by the US has created a diplomatic void that others are now filling. This trend toward working around the United States has been aggravated by widespread distaste for the arrogant and insulting phrasing of some US policy pronouncements. The undisguised disdain of some American envoys for the United Nations, the World Court, and regional organizations, and their open contempt for the views of the international communities these represent has also disinclined others to work with us if they can avoid it. Washington’s political marginalization in the Middle East is a predictable result of such “diplomacy-free foreign policies…”

…Scofflaw US behavior, the ill-considered uses of military power in wars of unilateral choice, and the contraction of freedom in the American homeland have indeed transformed our relationship with the world – but to our grave disadvantage. Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantánamo and the practice of “extraordinary rendition” have dishonored our traditions and defiled our international reputation. Militarism has debilitated our alliances, friendships, and partnerships and corroded our ability to lead. The belligerently surly, unwelcoming face we present to would-be visitors in our embassies and at our borders puts off even the most determined admirers of our society. The elements of a garrison state we have put in place at home have enfeebled our ability to inspire others with our ideas while depriving us of theirs. Much of the world is now seriously disenchanted with the United States. Most (though not all) of these self-inflicted wounds derive from our response to the atrocities of 9/11 and our policies toward the Middle East. We have shown not only that we can shoot ourselves in the foot, but that we can reload with exceptional speed and do it again and again.”

I strongly reccomend reading the rest of the speech.